test_pdf.pdf

SENA
ENATOR
JOSEPH
BIDEN
that Sandia National Laboratories has been working on for years. It could also include working with other major
powers to offer security assurances to both India and Pakistan if they were to give up their nuclear weapons.
A second great challenge is to stop the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons to the most dangerous
states. Here the problem starts with the administration’s security and nuclear strategies—pre-emption, the development
of a new nuclear weapon, the disdain this administration shows for the interests of other countries, and the
illusion of missile defense. Taken together, in my view, the doctrine of preventative war amounts to a proliferation
policy instead of a nonproliferation policy.
Consider the administration’s strategy of preventative war, including the possible use of nuclear weapons
against countries that may not even have weapons of mass destruction, let alone be threatening us with their use.
This strategy runs the risk of prompting countries to develop nuclear weapons rather than refrain from promoting
them since they risk a U.S. nuclear attack even if they do not go nuclear. They will see the acquisition of nuclear
weapons as their insurance policy against regime change, which we are not loath to talk about.
Then consider the administration’s effort to develop new nuclear weapons such as low-yield warheads and
bunker busters. In 1994 Paul Warnke warned especially, that if we were to develop low-yield nuclear weapons for
use against third-world countries, “the only logical response would be for small countries to develop nuclear
weapons and threaten the United States with a few primitive atomic bombs that could be delivered in comparatively
primitive ways.” Warnke’s warning certainly fits North Korea today and might describe Iran in the future.
Further, it doesn’t help when the new weapons the administration seeks are largely useless. New bunker busters
would cause tremendous civilian casualties due to radioactive fallout, as well as blasts, because they are highyield.
If biological weapons were stored in those bunkers, a nuclear attack would more likely spread the pathogens
then destroy them. New low-yield weapons would add little to the stockpile that already has low-yield options and
would lower the barrier between conventional and nuclear war—which is exactly the opposite direction we
should be moving.
Our search for new nuclear weapons has an aura of mindless devotion to nuclear war. As an old friend of
mine who introduced me to this issue, Frank Church, used to say, “Joe, listen to these nuclear theologians and you
will much more easily appreciate the debate about how many angels can be placed on the head of a pin.” None of
them make sense. Truth of the matter is I think this administration is still tied to that nuclear theology.
Our search for new nuclear weapons is one that I still do not quite understand. This undermines the central
bargain in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that we signed on to—that nuclear-weapon states would
gradually move away from nuclear weapons while non-nuclear-weapon states refrained from acquiring them.
That was the essence of the bargain. Consider how the administration has alienated the very countries we need to
promote and enforce nonproliferation. We undermined international solidarity when we withdrew from the ABM
[Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. We make other countries less willing to obey and enforce the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty when we failed to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, give up on START II, and badger
our scientists to come up with new ideas for new nuclear weapons.
The administration is especially feckless on a fissile material cutoff treaty. This has been a U.S. objective for
eight years because we have more than enough fissile material while countries of concern continue to seek them.
For over two years, the administration has castigated other countries for preventing negotiations from starting and
now there is a chance for success. However, the administration announced we may refuse to negotiate. As my
granddaughters might say, what’s up with that? (Laughter.) Will this promote solidarity with our allies who
worked for years to help us convince other countries to negotiate? Will this help maintain the support for a firm
stand on the need for Iran and North Korea to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs? I think it will have the
exact opposite impact.
And finally consider the delusion that the premature deployment of a national missile defense will in any
way solve our proliferation problem. Never mind that an ICBM [inter-continental ballistic missile] with a return
address is the least likely delivery vehicle a rogue state would use against us. By the way, that is the assessment of
the Defense Department as well. We all know that our missile defense will be untested when it is deployed. Several
critical components of the system won’t even be ready when the president declares it deployed. Its ability to defeat
even simple counter measures will be uncertain at best. Thomas Christie, the Pentagon’s chief of [operational] test
and evaluation, selected by this administration, just made that painfully clear when he wrote “it is not clear what
mission capability will be [demonstrated].” He’s referring to deployment.
So why is the Pentagon rushing to deploy this system? Will it meet the only test that matters in this area—and
that is making America more secure? Or will it give people a false sense of security? Missile defense is no substitute
for the hard work of nonproliferation.
So how do we counter proliferation to rogue states? The apparently successful recent agreement with Libya,
not withstanding what is argued, is a product of international isolation, sanctions, and hardheaded diplomacy,
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