test_pdf.pdf

ADDRESSING
FUTURE
ARMS
CONTROL
AND SECURITY
PROBLEMS
captain, major, sitting on alert seven days at a time in an underground bunker with a B-52 loaded with four to six
nuclear weapons. Unless you’ve done that and sat and thought about the klaxon going off—oh, by the way, the
klaxon went off at least twice a week; you didn’t know if it was the real thing or an exercise. You ran out to your
plane. You think a lot about killing millions of people. You worry about your family that are left behind. So I’ve
thought a lot about this. My point is God help us if we ever develop a nuclear weapon that looks attractive to use.
That’s the path we’re going with this initiative to build a nuclear weapon that perhaps would be attractive to use.
And the second part of your question, having to do with could I think of any circumstances. I could probably
come up with a circumstance but I think it would be very unrealistic. I’ll give you one circumstance. The North
Koreans launch an ICBM that strikes Los Angeles with a nuclear warhead on board, and kills millions of people.
That might be a circumstance. But that would be the most incredibly stupid thing for the North Koreans to do. If
I was Kim Jong Il’s advisor, I’d say, “why are you going to do that?” Senator Biden said there’s going to be a
postage stamp because we have systems in space today that can show within tens of seconds and tens of meters
where a missile is coming from. Tens of seconds, tens of meters. That doesn’t make any sense, but that’s one
scenario. Kim Jong Il, you just bought the farm.
I like Richard’s scenario much better. We’re using systems that don’t have postage stamps where you can do
lots of damage.
Q: Greg Thielmann, former State Department. My question is for Richard Speier. I was surprised to hear you
say that you thought the MTCR and ballistic missile defense were complementary.
MS. KELLEHER: I think he said, “could be.”
Q: Could be. If one thinks back to the Cold War, we know how the U.S. reacted to the Moscow ABM system, or
how the Soviets reacted to the prospect the U.S. might pursue SDI in terms of making sure that their offensive
systems could counter that system. When I looked at Pakistani reactions to Russian help for Indian ATBM efforts,
or Chinese reaction to Taiwan ballistic missile defense improvements, I don’t see that dynamic you’re talking about
that could happen. Could you give me two or three examples of opponents where you think when one side sees the
other developing ballistic missile defenses, they’ll decide, well, let’s get out of the ballistic missile business?
MR. SPEIER: Let’s talk about the objectives of missile nonproliferation. They are to increase the cost, schedule,
and unreliability of missile development programs. If on top of that you can increase the unreliability that a
missile successfully launched will successfully destroy its target, you are adding to the dubious quality of a
missile program, and that’s complementary.
The missile technology control regime has had some major successes. It’s had some well-publicized failures.
I mean, certainly India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea had some spectacular missile tests, but other missile
programs were stopped—Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and missile programs were rolled back in Eastern
Europe. Quiet successes were made in preventing sophistication from getting into some of the missile programs
that we saw. By preventing sophistication from getting into these missile programs, we make them much more
vulnerable to missile defenses. So missile defenses help missile nonproliferation. Missile nonproliferation helps
missile defenses.
MS. KELLEHER: Next question, please.
Q: I’m Howard Hallman of Methodists United for Peace and Justice. This morning your rules allowed
comments from the floor and I’d like to make a brief comment. It’s been a very interesting discussion today about
the technicalities of arms control, nuclear weapons, politics, strategies, and military strategy. There’s a dimension
that’s been missing, however, and that’s the moral dimension. Nuclear weapons are inherently immoral. They
kill innocent people, they ruin the environment, they’re the ultimate evil. Even deterrence is immoral because
you’re holding hostage innocent people for military and foreign policy.
Therefore, I would urge all of you folks in the Arms Control Association to add the moral dimension to your
discussion because it’s a very important one which should not be overlooked.
MS. KELLEHER: Next question, please.
Q: I’m Kathy Crandall with the Union of Concerned Scientists and my question is for Matt Bunn. You
mentioned on tactical nuclear weapons something like a presidential nuclear initiative with monitoring, and I
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