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ASSESSING<br />
THE RECORD<br />
OF ARMS<br />
CONTROL<br />
There’s a separate question about this concerning arms control. All the selling and the complacency being<br />
involved in arms control business, it is sort of bureaucratic inertia of each agency or the keeper of the treaties. To sell,<br />
this is a very powerful tool. We can’t do everything to prevent proliferation. That’s almost human nature to do so. By<br />
doing so, in a way, you give, implant a sort of, a sense of complacency among the people and make people come to<br />
think, okay, the biological weapons are taken care of, chemical weapons are taken care of, but it’s not true, as Avis<br />
said. They can be only useful as a part of the set of measures, national means of verification, plus those international<br />
obligations. One day I asked Richard Butler, the last chairman of UNSCOM [UN Special Commission]. He told me,<br />
no, don’t put all the responsibility on verification. You can’t do everything with it. It’s only useful as a set of, first,<br />
political commitments of the countries not to have those weapons, and second, international legal obligations not to<br />
have them. Verification regimes can do a useful work to verify non-possession or nonproliferation. So I think that’s<br />
the problem.<br />
Then this question of internationalization—I think it’s one very interesting proposal by Mr. ElBaradei. There<br />
are two big questions to implement it. One question is there are already countries with vast fuel cycle industries like<br />
Japan, Germany, Belgium, and Canada—it would be very difficult to persuade those countries to submit the existing<br />
facilities. It’s a billion-dollar industry for those countries. How do you do it? But if you allow them to keep them and<br />
if you say we just want to prevent the new ones to do so, countries like Iran will immediately say, this is discrimination,<br />
and how can you multilaterally agree on such a measure. That’s a big challenge but I think we need to explore<br />
this possibility.<br />
MR. STEINBRUNER: This will be the last question, and the panel can respond to what he is about to say and<br />
to the others, but we have just a few minutes left.<br />
Q: Thank you, it’s a great honor to be among the last. Vladimir Rybachenkov, Russian Embassy, senior<br />
counselor for political and military affairs. I have a question to Ms. Harris. I’ve heard you mentioning Russia among<br />
your proliferation concerns inside Chemical Weapons Convention. Well, it’s rather strange for me to hear it, taking<br />
into account that Russia as well as the United States, is a founding member of the convention and there we do have<br />
a rather developed partnership in this field together with the United States. But nevertheless I would like to ask you,<br />
do you have some specific concerns that could be presented to the organization of the Chemical Weapons Convention?<br />
We did have a lot of inspections and no concerns registered, and do you have any specific concerns that could<br />
be presented at that organization or are they just some theoretical concerns that, well, for example, Russia also has<br />
about chemical weapons and the United States? I do understand that we have a free conference and it’s proper<br />
forum to discuss these issues, it’s not a formal talks among government so we must discuss these concerns here.<br />
Thank you.<br />
MS. HARRIS: I don’t think it’s a secret that there have been concerns since even before entry into force of the<br />
CWC about Russian declarations under the Wyoming MOU, the bilateral data exchange that the U.S. and Russia<br />
had. And those concerns have revolved around three issues. The first is the size of the stockpile that has been<br />
declared. Russia has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents. There are questions, at least<br />
within the U.S. government, as to whether that is in fact the total size of the stockpile that Russia inherited from the<br />
former Soviet Union. Secondly, there have been questions about the composition of the stockpile and in particular<br />
about the work on “novichoks” under the former Soviet Union—agents that are based on chemicals not on the CWC<br />
schedules. Russia has acknowledged that such weapons were researched under the former Soviet Union but has<br />
not acknowledged that those “novichoks” form part of the existing stockpile. This is a question about which there<br />
are concerns in the U.S. Finally, there have been concerns about whether or not all of the facilities that were part of<br />
the Soviet chemical weapons program have been declared as required under the treaty. It has been a while since I<br />
saw the details on all of this but I think Russia declared only a very limited number of development facilities for a<br />
stockpile of tens of thousands of tons of a variety of agents and munitions types. So there are outstanding concerns<br />
about whether the facility declarations have also been fully accurate.<br />
I just want to react to two things that Avis said. First, just to keep the record straight, on the issue of the protocol,<br />
I think a comprehensive approach is preferable, would have been preferable, and did not share the view of the Bush<br />
administration with respect to the protocol under negotiation. Declaration and inspection provisions are mutually<br />
reinforcing, and if we could get both, I think that that would be very valuable to the BWC. What I was trying to say<br />
in my comments on the protocol is that, at least for the foreseeable future, I don’t think this sort of comprehensive<br />
approach is politically feasible and therefore I think we need to break apart the problem and focus on the most<br />
urgent pieces, I would start with creating a capacity to pursue concerns about suspect facilities.<br />
Secondly, on the issue of context, I was trying to make a similar point and in fact, looking for a quote from<br />
21<br />
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