test_pdf.pdf

ADDRESSING
FUTURE
ARMS
CONTROL
AND SECURITY
PROBLEMS
acquiring missiles. Missiles, because of the large number of items they require, as we’ve already mentioned, do not
require that every item be intercepted, just enough of them. Entire missile systems are of course so bulky that they
are relatively easy to spot when they are in transit. So the Proliferation Security Initiative looks like a winner that
is supported by all parts of the political spectrum and that very much complements our nonproliferation policy.
The fifth approach is the use of military forces to destroy missiles before they have been launched, so-called
counter-force operations. Now this will always be a necessary part of our military planning, but it is difficult.
General Habiger could talk about it with more knowledge than perhaps anyone else in this room, but just finding
mobile missile systems is difficult enough. In a growing number of nations, such systems are not only difficult to
find but they are deeply buried in tunnels and very difficult to destroy. The combination of deep burial and
concealment is a daunting military problem and one that we will continue to work at, but not necessarily one that
is guaranteed to be satisfactorily solved any time soon.
And the sixth and last alternative for dealing with the problem of missile proliferation is missile defense.
What I’d like to do is contrast and compare the first and the sixth of these alternatives—missile nonproliferation,
the MTCR on the one hand, and missile defense on the other hand. As Senator Biden said, missile defense is not
a substitute for the difficult work of nonproliferation. But it may be—and he didn’t say this, but I am—a complement
to missile nonproliferation. In fact, many people from all parts of the political spectrum are coming to the
point of view that missile defense and the MTCR may indeed be complementary. The president’s NSPD—that’s
National Security Presidential Directive 23, issued last year—in fact said that missile defense and the MTCR are
complementary.
Why are they complementary? Well, missile defense attempts to shoot at a missile in its boost, mid-course,
and re-entry phase, while missile nonproliferation attempts to shoot at a missile in its research, development and
production phase. They’re all trying to stop the same thing. It’s just that they’re shooting at different points in the
trajectory. This is indeed complementary.
There are other ways in which the two complement each other. If missile defense is likely to work—and
that’s always been a question—but if it is likely to be effective, it makes it less attractive to get in the business of
developing missiles in the first place, very much complementing the efforts of the MTCR to stop development. On
the other hand, if the MTCR is effective in slowing down or stopping the proliferation of missiles, it reduces the
stress that missile defense systems face. So they really can complement each other.
The problem is that they can also compete with each other. Some missile defense systems are over that line
that I talked about—the ability to deliver 500 kilograms to 300 kilometers—not the systems that are in use or in
major development right now in most of the countries: the Patriot, the Medium Extended Air Defense (MEAD)
system, which is being developed by the U.S. and Europe, most of the versions of the Russian S-300 system, or the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. These are not over the line. But the Israeli Arrow system is
over the line, and in fact has been originally demonstrated as a target missile simulating an offensive missile to be
intercepted by another Arrow. The United States sea-launch system, the SM-3, is slightly over the line. The
Ground-Based Interceptor, the large missile defense rockets that are to be based in Alaska and the Vandenberg Air
Force Base are way over the line. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor, which is now in the design phase as lategeneration
United States missile defense system, has been described as a small ICBM.
So by sharing missile defense systems, we may be sharing very large rockets. These large rockets can be used
offensively. For example, the SA-2, a large Soviet air defense missile, was adapted as an offensive missile by India,
China, Iran, Iraq, and Serbia. In fact, one of the plans that was discovered to be the next step in Iraq’s clandestine
missile development program was to take the SA-2 engines, which were supposed to be limited to being used on
missiles compliant with the United Nations’ resolutions, and to adapt them to missiles along the Indian design
or bigger, to enable them to reach ranges of up to 500 kilometers.
So missile defense rockets can pose problems. At the same time, the desire to share missile defense technology
can pose problems for missile nonproliferation. NSPD-23 states that the United States should administer the
MTCR so it does not impede missile defense cooperation. Well, what does this mean? Does this mean we should
begin to fuzz that line in order to spread missile defense interceptors? If we do, would we be able to construct
another line, or will we just go to missile defense as an alternative to missile nonproliferation? This is an issue
that the policymakers are going to have to grapple with in the very near future.
My suggestion is that there are many effective missile defense systems below the line that can be shared, and
that in the future the major role of missile defense will be to defend very large areas. The Ground-Based Interceptor,
from one site, could defend all of Europe. So many of the nations being defended will not have access to the
rockets themselves. And in fact, there’s no reason for the United States to even give up control of those rockets. We
can operate the defensive system and unify the control of it with all the other missile defense systems in the world.
It’s militarily attractive, and it’s certainly attractive from the point of view of nonproliferation.
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