Australian Maritime Issues 2005 - Royal Australian Navy

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60 YEARS ON: LEYTE GULF, 1944 79 Another key principle of war is sustaining an operation. As Leyte Gulf demonstrated, the difficulty of sustaining power projection operations over extended distances should not be underestimated. The logistics effort was enormous, with extended and potentially vulnerable supply lines stretching over 5000 nm. Of particular note is the substantial additional effort required to protect the ships of the logistic force, removing escort vessels and aircraft from offensive operations. A third key principle of war is cooperation. Units of the RAN provided essential capabilities that complemented those of the US Navy at Leyte Gulf. Several, such as the infantry landing ships and logistics ships, were what might now be considered as ‘niche’ capabilities. The ability to operate in Allied coalitions and alliances, from 1901 to the current day, has been predicated on cooperation, in terms of shared or substantially similar doctrine, equipment and control arrangements. The landings and naval battles at Leyte Gulf in October 1944 demonstrated the utility of maritime forces in power projection operations. Amphibious ships moved ground troops 500 nm to landing beaches. Logistics ships moved vital stores, ammunition and rations, directly and indirectly, over 5000 nm to maintain land and naval forces in the area of operations. Sea-based air power provided essential air cover to the fleet and land forces in an operation beyond the range of Allied land-based aircraft. In all but the latter, the RAN made a small, but substantial, contribution to the successful outcome of the operation. Published as Issue 11, October 2004 Notes 1 Royal Navy, Naval Staff History Second World War: War with Japan, Volume VI; The Advance to Japan, British Admiralty, 1959. 2 G. H. Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1968, p. 501. 3 The current RAN submarines HMAS Collins and HMAS Dechaineaux commemorate these officers. 4 Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, p. 511. He notes that instances of suicide attacks by damaged aircraft had been observed since 1942. The first organised kamikaze attacks occurred on 25 October 1944 in the attack on the US escort carriers Santee and Suwannee. 5 Sunk: battleships Musashi, Fuso, Yamashiro; fleet aircraft carrier Zuikaku; light aircraft carriers Zuiho, Chitose, Chiyoda; heavy cruisers Nachi, Atago, Maya, Chikuma, Chokai, Suzuya, Mogami; light cruisers Tama, Noshiro, Abukuma; destroyers Nowake, Hatsutsuki, Akitsuki, Yamagumo, Michishio, Asagumo, Hayashimo, Fusinnami, Shiranuhi. Damaged: battleships Yamato, Ise, Hyuga; heavy cruisers Kumano, Takao, Myoko; light cruiser Yahagi; destroyer Kiyoshima.
80 AUSTRALIAN MARITIME ISSUES 2005: SPC-A ANNUAL The Battles of Leyte - main moves 13th - 25th October 1944 (from G.H. Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945, p. 502)
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About the Authors Midshipman Steve
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Foreword The Sea Power Centre - Aus
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