Australian Maritime Issues 2005 - Royal Australian Navy

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143 Rethinking Australia’s Maritime Strategy Dr Gregory P. Gilbert The Commonwealth of Australia’s, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has released a report on Australia’s Maritime Strategy. 1 The inquiry was aimed at developing a comprehensive understanding of maritime strategy and its place within Australia’s broader military strategy and defence policy. Australia’s maritime strategy includes more than an examination of our naval or maritime forces, and more than an assessment of the maritime contribution to the defence of Australia. Maritime strategy impacts upon the security of our immediate neighbourhood; the effectiveness of international coalitions beyond our immediate neighbourhood; as well as upon Australia’s peacetime tasks. Terms of Reference The Joint Committee inquired into: - defence capability to apply the maritime strategy outlined in Defence 2000 in the current strategic environment; 2 - primary roles in Australia’s maritime strategy of the key components of Defence, including the three Services, the Defence Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) command and control structure; - impact of Australia’s maritime strategy on ADF capacity to participate in combined, multinational regional and global coalition military operations; - integration of maritime strategy with the other elements of Australian national power to achieve specified national strategic interests and objectives; - impact of the evolving strategic environment on Australia’s maritime strategy; and - integration of Australian defence industry into capability development to support a maritime strategy. Maritime strategy - a definition A modern maritime strategy involves air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control. A maritime strategy is not just about naval forces or naval strategy. The key elements of a maritime strategy include sea denial, sea control and power projection: - Sea Denial has the aim of prevention of the use of the sea by another force. This is defined as the condition that exists when an adversary is denied the ability to use an area of sea for its own purposes, for a period of time. Sea Denial implies a more passive posture where the emphasis is on defence (although this does not preclude the employment of offensive capabilities), and where the initiative is likely to remain with the attacking power.
144 AUSTRALIAN MARITIME ISSUES 2005: SPC-A ANNUAL - Sea Control is defined as that condition which exists when one has freedom of action to use an area for one’s own purposes for a period of time and, if required, to deny its use to an opponent. - Power Projection while not exclusively a maritime strategic concept, recognises that maritime forces, through Sea Control, can shape, influence and control the strategic environment, and can deliver combat forces ashore if necessary. Critics of the current defence strategy have suggested that, in recent years, there has been an over-emphasis on the key strategic objective of ensuring the defence of Australia and its direct approaches. They have suggested that the ‘defence of Australian territory’ results in a disconnect between strategy and practice. That is, the ADF is, in practice, engaged in a variety of tasks which require it to be engaged regionally and globally. Therefore, Australia’s defence strategy needs to be revised to ensure that it reflects what the ADF does in practice. The majority of evidence, including that from senior defence analysts, claims that in recent practice Australia has not had a fully developed maritime strategy. Maritime strategies are significant in military planning because they provide the means to apply power flexibly over a range of contingencies and areas. Evidence to the inquiry suggested that Australia currently has given priority to one element only of maritime strategy namely a ‘sea denial’ capability. A maritime strategy provides nations with the ability to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control. The littoral is defined as the areas to seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence from the sea. The classic elements of a maritime strategy, include: sea denial, sea control and power projection. Where reference is made to a ‘modern maritime strategy’, the meaning is meant to convey a maritime strategy involving air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control. Defence operations in the littoral require the need for effective joint operations. Even though many aspects of the world international, socio-political and economic framework have changed significantly over the last 20 years, the classic concepts of sea denial, sea control and power projection still remain important for Australia’s maritime strategy during the 21st century. The type of capabilities needed here include: underwater, surface, and air warfare. A new strategic priority of defence of Australia and its direct approaches together with greater focus on, and acquisition of, capabilities to operate in the region and globally in defence of our non-territorial interests would have implications for defence expenditure. The Committee supported the continuation of the Collins class submarines, the acquisition of airborne early warning and control aircraft, air-to-air refuellers, air warfare destroyers and the replacement aircraft for the F/A-18 and F-111; however, more capability was needed to support Army, heavy lift and amphibious operations. The Committee recognised that Australia’s strategic interests are driven, in part, by the need to protect, monitor and control our 200 nm economic exclusion [sic] zone (EEZ). In
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About the Authors Midshipman Steve
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Foreword The Sea Power Centre - Aus
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57 Why the ADF needs a Minewarfare
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69 90 Years On: Rabaul and Sydney/E
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