Australian Maritime Issues 2005 - Royal Australian Navy

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FUTURE SEA POWER 29 sea control by coastal states, if achieved in the future, will invalidate this assumption. Pervasive and permanent human presence (coastguards, civilian assets, etc.) will make it a much more complex environment, as government and private entities are more likely to actively regulate larger areas of ocean. Maritime forces will therefore be operating within the fabric of a nation (in or near national heartland), and as such be more readily observable, with less time and room to manoeuvre unopposed. On the defensive side of the equation, the protection of national maritime jurisdictions may not fall simply to existing, traditional maritime forces (navies and air forces). These forces have high capital costs, a large proportion of which can be attributed to operating in the marine and air environments, and being able to operate almost anywhere in the world. While this provides exceptional and valuable flexibility, this is not a necessity if the only aim is to protect a fixed asset. The cost of armaments is always an issue for any nation, any differences being ones of degree. In pursuit of maximum effect for minimum expenditure, a modern iteration of ‘flotilla defence’ may seem a cost-effective solution, just as it did at the start of the 20th century. For national armed forces this could pose a further institutional challenge, as the foundation may be coastal artillery rather than ships or aircraft. National military forces might have to critically examine how such defences can be provided, as any future coastal artillery will have to operate seamlessly with naval and air forces, as well as civil authorities. The current pre-eminence of the US Navy (USN) is also likely to promote consideration of ‘flotilla defence’. No nation can lightly contemplate directly challenging the USN: this is unlikely for anything other than the defence of vital national interests. Furthermore, as all nations’ interests coincide in the safe passage of international trade, and US interests are at least the equal of other nations, it is unlikely that many nations would seek to have the ability to exert sea control at any great distance from their coasts. 20 In other words, few nations will have the motivation to exercise temporary sea control. But permanent sea control of national jurisdiction, provided by a form of ‘flotilla defence’, is very likely to be attractive and important to many countries. Conclusion This paper is intended to stimulate debate on the future of the nature and practice of maritime strategy, both at the national and military levels; however, an appreciation of the history of humanity in the maritime environment over the last thousand years, and certainly over the last 50 to 100 years, does indicate firm trends. The most fundamental of these trends is for a more permanent and pervasive human presence in the maritime environment. This paper contends that this must have implications for our conception of that environment, and for the practice of international relations as they relate to maritime affairs. It also has implications for maritime forces and for navies in particular, as the ultimate representatives of national power at sea. As the imprint of civilisation on this planet grows, our dependence on the oceans will at least remain at current levels, and probably grow. Nation states, as the basic unit of international governance, will compete to obtain the greatest benefit from their maritime jurisdictions, areas that will more than ever be regarded as their heartland, and
30 AUSTRALIAN MARITIME ISSUES 2005: SPC-A ANNUAL essential to the fabric of the nation. Navies and all maritime forces must understand and adapt to these changes if they are to remain relevant and effective in representing and implementing national will. It should be noted that this paper is far from an exhaustive survey of the issues that are involved. It has focused on the future of maritime strategy from a national perspective, flowing from the principles established by Mahan and Corbett; however, the development of international fora, which may or may not be headed by the UN, and the conclusion of comprehensive treaties and other international regimes, such as the LOSC, will continue to open up avenues for the development of international relations. Clearly these issues are likely to have further impacts on maritime strategy in the future, but what is certain for now at least, is that sea power and properly configured maritime forces in particular, will remain an essential contributor to both national and international order in the 21st century maritime domain. Editor’s Note: This paper is based upon the author’s presentation at the 2003 King-Hall Naval History Conference. Notes 1 The author is indebted to Professor George Baer, Commodore Sam Bateman, RAN Rtd, Dr John Reeve, Commodore Jack McCaffrie, RANR, Captain Ian Pfennigwerth, RAN Rtd and Lieutenant Commander Jason Sears, RAN for their encouragement and assistance in commenting on various drafts of the paper. Any errors remain the responsibility of the author. 2 The idea that the maritime environment has changed is not new. See H. Moinville, (translation from French by Commander P. R. Compton-Hall), Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, pp. 46-48, and also B. W. Watson, The Changing Face of the World’s Navies: 1945 to the Present, Arms and Armour, London, 1991, pp. 234-238. 3 It is important to distinguish between national maritime strategy, which pertains to a whole of government approach to maritime affairs, and military maritime strategy, which is concerned with the exercise of military power in the maritime environment. Military maritime strategy is usually a subset of national maritime strategy. 4 Alfred Thayer Mahan, quoted in J. Gooch, ‘Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett’ in C. S. Gray and R. W. Barnett (eds), Seapower and Strategy, Tri-Service Press, London, 1989, p. 33. 5 Whale hunting was the first issue to gain international attention as far as the conservation of marine resources was concerned. The widespread realisation that similar principles applied to almost all commercial fisheries took longer. For an example of the transitional attitudes, on the cusp of modern appreciation of fish stocks see E. Grove, The Future of Sea Power, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1990, pp. 42-44. There is an acknowledgment of the pressure on fish stocks, but a hope that technology will enable enough to be found and utilised. 6 Some other matters which are linked to the state of the marine environment are the sustainability of certain types of land use (land clearing and fertiliser usage), and the viability and health of some coastal communities. 7 I am indebted to Commodore Sam Bateman, RAN Rtd, for bringing to my attention some general trends in the development of maritime law.
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