Australian Maritime Issues 2005 - Royal Australian Navy

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AUSTRALIAN MARITIME ISSUES 2005: SPC-A ANNUAL
biological, radiological or nuclear weapons). Such assets may be attractive in limited wars,
possibly even lowering the threshold for conflict, as an aggressor perceives the opportunity
to make a serious and direct threat or attack, further encouraged by the knowledge that
modern media will help to amplify the effect on the target nation’s population.
Day to day control of maritime zones is less dramatic than conflict, but equally as
important. Border control issues such as the financial, immigration, sanitary and customs
areas identified in the LOSC on the rights and responsibilities in the Contiguous Zone,
presently dealt with mainly within ports, may have to be addressed at or near the maritime
boundary to enable nations to exert effective control. This is complicated because the
seas, as a medium, do not lend themselves to clear demarcation, so points of entry to a
nation’s maritime jurisdiction are less well defined than in the terrestrial domain.
Bismarck, Disraeli and Palmerston are variously quoted as saying that ‘nations have
no permanent friends, only permanent interests’. Assuming that alliance relationships
arise mostly when national interests are coincident or complementary, it follows that
acquisition of substantial ‘maritime heartland’ will create the potential for changes in
existing alliances. This will be most obvious for nations that have substantial coastal state
interests as well as relationships with traditional maritime nations, such as the United
States (US) and Britain. Therefore this could represent a future challenge for Australia,
and although no great power is likely to object specifically to Australia’s exercise of power
within its vast maritime jurisdiction, it may well object to the principles involved.
For Australia some of these issues will not seem as pressing, for although we have maritime
boundaries, the distances involved act to reduce the pressure on the environment. While
this might reduce the immediacy of the issue, it does not mean that it will be irrelevant:
neighbouring countries, trading partners and allies will still require us to have a coherent
position. Australian foreign and defence policies must therefore appreciate that other
nations may regard activity in their maritime areas as an immediate interest, by virtue of
the smaller distances and greater concentration of people and activity involved.
It is also worth noting that despite the almost certain opposition of the US to any further
expansion of coastal state sovereignty/rights that impinge on its interests, this will not
necessarily stop the progression advanced in this paper. For while the US may gain
acquiescence through the threat or use of overwhelming force, this may not apply to
relationships and issues which are not important to the US. Moreover, the pressure for
change will be too great for even the US to resist: it will be a slow but relentless move
driven by human interest in the environment and marine resources. National self-interest
may not emerge like Minerva, but less confronting arms of government power such as
coastguards will be used to assert control over maritime heartland. 17
All of these matters of importance to a nation revolve around the ability to observe
activity in their areas of maritime interest, to regulate it and, if necessary, to enforce
their rights and responsibilities; thus exercising control of the sea, permanent or limited
as the case may be. In the last century, navies, increasingly supported by air forces,
fulfilled this function; however, protection of maritime heartland may require additional
and different national institutions or institutional relationships. Possibly modern coastal