Best of Miami Portfolios 2001 - Units.muohio.edu

enzene compound. This compound could be found often at an arm’s length away from the workers
since they used it so much (Meyer). By using this compound and making the “dry stock” tacky
again, the workers could reuse the rubber and make more tires. Jan Wagner, who worked at the
Decatur plant, said that the company also pressured workers to repair sidewall blisters by punching
holes in the tire with an awl. Instead of throwing out the bad tire and making a new one, workers
used this technique to speed up the process. The workers placed these so-called “green tires” on
the floor to make room for more tires. The rubber, usually not dry yet, picked up dirt and other
foreign matter from the floor (“Firestone CEO…”).
Firestone also had a tendency to use bad rubber in production, trying to make a large amount
of tires. Bad rubber, which had barely passed inspection, was often mixed with good rubber then
used to make new tires (“Firestone CEO…”). Hogan also saw oil, water, cigarette butts, finger
tape, chunks of hardened rubber, and metal or wood shavings mixed with the tire stock (Meyer).
Lonnie Bart held many positions in the Decatur plant and confessed that steel belt material should
stay in a climate-controlled room. Corrosion and rust, which make it hard for rubber to adhere to
steel, also would be avoided with the use of a controlled room. The supply of rubber often stayed
in other areas for up to thirty minutes. The company, although knowing it should throw out that
material, often reprocessed it to remove rust and put it back into the storage area instead (“Firestone
CEO…”).
Besides the controversy with Firestone production flaws, another factor that contributed to
the faulty tires came from the size of the Decatur plant. The total size of the massive plant, 800,000
square feet, created a major problem with storage and working space within the company. The
company set up plastic tents over machines to protect them from leaking roofs. Moisture causes
corrosion of the steel belts that, in turn, cause belt separations; thus, those leaks became a critical
factor in failures (Meyer).
The workers, as well as their supervisors, knew about the obvious problems. Management
at the Firestone plants knew of the “dry stock” and crowded working conditions. Hogan once
rejected a load of dry stock adding with it a note that said, “‘If you get this roll of steel, I’ve rejected
it,’” then signed and dated it. The next day the roll came back to him for inspection with a message
from another tire builder that said, “‘ Hey Alan, I got that message you left on that rejected roll of
steel.’” That roll had been sent to the stock room, re-ticketed as acceptable material and then sent
back into the plant for production (Meyer). Plant supervisors had access to information concerning
rejected material, the number of bad tires, and also the machines that were not functioning properly.
A company computer called the Intermac, as well as a continuously rolling video monitor showed
shutdown machines along with the areas in the plant that had problems with material such as “dry
stock” (Meyer). Obviously, the company chose to ignore these problems.
The tire industry has made great strides since the 1970’s. Tires last longer and are less
puncture prone and contribute to better fuel economy and a greater grip on roads. However, the
public doesn’t understand how important they are to vehicle safety and performance (Ulrich). The
bigger demand for automobiles has created a greater demand for tires also. As the market grows,
so does the push for production. Flaws in the Bridgestone/Firestone’s manufacturing and
production process caused the defects the recalled ATX, ATX II and Wilderness AT tires. Pressure
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