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things on their own. They're running ahead of us.” And that old shrewd fox, he said “If you all aren't in it, I'll put you in it. I'll put you at the head of it. I'll endorse it. I'll welcome it... “This is what they did at the march on Washington. They joined it... became part of it, took it over. And as they took it over, it lost its militancy. It ceased to be angry, it ceased to be hot, it ceased to be uncompromising. Why, it even ceased to be a march. It became a picnic, a circus. Nothing but a circus, with clowns and all... “No, it was a sellout. It was a takeover... They controlled it so tight, they told those Negroes what time to hit town, where to stop, what signs to carry, what song to sing, what speech they could make, and what speech they couldn't make, and then told them to get our of town by sundown.” (quoted in How Nonviolence Protects the State, p. 26) Indeed, the protesters scheduled activities were strictly controlled, pre-made and government-approved placards were distributed, and speeches were censored by the White House for any references to militant resistance. At the conclusion of the event, organizers immediately moved to disperse the rally under controlled conditions. The threat of a mass mobilization of Blacks in Washington DC also prompted one of the largest domestic security operations in that city's history: “The FBI responded by mounting a vast surveillance operation. The bureau instructed every field office across the country to provide intelligence on how many local black activists planned to converge on Washington, whether they had any affiliation with communist organizations, and if hate groups, like the KKK, planned to sabotage them... [Washington chief of police] Murray mobilized 1,900 of his... officers... He also drafted in hundreds of additional officers from neighbouring suburban forces, who had attended specially organized riot training courses... “Since 1,900 officers alone would be incapable of quelling an unruly crowd of some 200,000 blacks, 2,400 National Guardsmen were sworn in as 'special officers' on the eve of the protest and granted temporary powers of arrest... “Life in Washington was completely disrupted in the run-up to the march. Government offices shut down, and federal employees were advised to stay home. Acting under recently acquired emergency powers, the commissioners issued a 24-hour ban on the sale of alcohol... “Fears about the violent potential of the march brought about an unprecedented degree of cooperation between the administration and black leaders. Bayard Rustin, who... was in overall charge of its planning, agreed immediately to bring forward the start time of the march so that protesters would not be left wandering the streets after dark. Rustin also promised Justice Department officials that 'there would not be any stunts or efforts to obstruct traffic, such as laying down in the streets, sit-ins or other activities which might irritate or inflame others.' Under intense pressure from the Kennedy administration... Rustin also agreed to a change in venue. The original plan, for a mass protest on the steps of the US Capitol, was quietly shelved. It was replaced with a demonstration at the foot of the Lincoln Memorial, a 180-acre site that was easier to police.” (The Bystander, pp. 6-7) “Even after weeks of meticulous planning, administration officials could not rule out the threat of violence. So on march day itself, the District of Columbus was placed under virtual martial law, with the president ordering the biggest Malcolm X. peacetime military buildup in American history. By mid-morning on August 28, five military bases on the outskirts of the capital were bursting with activity—a heavily armed, 4,000-strong task force... prepared for deployment... At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 15,000... troops... were placed on standby, ready to be airlifted at the first sign of trouble.” (The Bystander, p. 7) Reporting on the March on Washington, Russel Baker, of the New York Times, echoed Malcolm's description of the event: “Instead of the emotional horde of angry militants that many had feared, what Washington saw was a vast army of quiet, middle-class Americans who had come in the spirit of the church outing.” (The Bystander, p. 436) _________________________________________ Inside the March: The Pacifists and the President To show that Malcolm is not alone in his assessment of the March on Washington, the following text is from www.whitehousehistory.org and is entitled “ JFK, A. Phillip Randolph, and the March on Washington” (retrieved April 2010). On June 21-22, 1963, President Kennedy met with leaders of the main civil rights organizations, including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Urban Negro League, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). When 50
it was announced that a March for Jobs and Freedom was to be held on August 28, Kennedy requested that the June 22 meeting be used to discuss the march. Note: Subtitles not in original article, footnote numbering revised for excerpt. “Boss, I can't stop it because I didn't start it” “Whitney Young of the National Urban League asked Kennedy at one point in the exchange of ideas if he was opposed to the March on Washington. Kennedy told him he thought it was a big mistake to announce the march before the bill had even been sent to committee, then added, "We want success in the Congress, not a big show on the Capitol."[1] A. Philip Randolph [the main organizer of the march, a longtime Black civil rights activist *] took the other side, telling him, "The Negroes are already in the streets," referring to more militant black groups who were less inclined to embrace the nonviolent strategies of seasoned leaders. "If they are bound to be in the streets in any case is it not better that they be led by organizations dedicated to civil rights and disciplined by struggle rather than to leave them to other leaders who care neither about civil rights nor non-violence" he asked. Then he added, rather ominously, "If the civil rights leadership were to call the Negroes off the streets, it is problematic whether they would come."[2] Pacifist Internal Policing “Nonviolence was essential to the success of the March, and the organizers thought of every detail. All marchers would be under the leadership of locally appointed captains who would account for their safety and discipline. Two thousand marchers were trained for "internal marshaling." They would wear white shirts and dark trousers and strive to create an atmosphere of "passive, peaceful, nonviolent behaviour."[3] “To minimize the risk of confrontation with hostile groups, the march was planned as a one-day, Wednesday event. With no weekend on either side of the march day, most workers would need to get back home. Ceremonies would last no later than 4:00 p.m., so the buses could be loaded and out of town before darkness fell. The organizers would work hand in hand with government agencies as well.” misgivings, he made sure the attorney general, Robert Kennedy, and his assistant, Burke Marshall, were in constant contact with the march organizers so that no security question was left to chance. As early as six weeks prior to the date of the march, representatives of the attorney general met with Randolph and Rustin specifically, and they worked through each relevant decision together. Of great importance was the site of the rally. The Lincoln Memorial was the perfect spot. Blacks had used the monument, dedicated in 1922, as a symbol of freedom, linking their struggle against discrimination with the memory of the Great Emancipator.[4] It was virtually hallowed ground–not a setting likely to stir anger and violence. To ensure better control, the march would take place within a narrow range of less than a mile–between the Washington Monument and the memorial. As time for the event neared and problems of logistics arose, Attorney General Kennedy and his deputy Marshall continued to offer the full range of government resources. One of the president’s advance organizers, and an expert on crowd control, even thought of what to do if speakers at the rally stirred the audience to dangerous levels. Should that happen, from his position behind Lincoln’s statue he could flip a special switch that would cut the power on the public address system.”[5] President John F. Kennedy meets with Black civil rights leaders to discuss March on Washington, 1963. 'Non-Violent ' Police State “Furthermore, if internal crowd controls put in place by Rustin did not work, the government was prepared. On the day of the March, all leave was cancelled for Washington’s 2,900 police and for 1,000 police in the nearby suburbs.[6] The city banned liquor sales, and Washington hospitals cancelled elective surgery for the day in case any injuries put extra demands on the facility. Several thousand U.S. troops were standing by in Maryland and Virginia to be called into service if needed. Some thought all of this preparation "overkill." The black comedian Dick Gregory told Burke Marshall, "I know these senators and congressmen are scared of what’s going to happen. I’ll tell you what’s going to happen. It’s going to be a great big Sunday picnic."[7] Pacifist-Police Collaboration “[O]nce President Kennedy accepted that the March on Washington would take place despite his Pacifist Censorship “The potential for political fallout became crystal clear when the White House got a copy of the speech that 51
Page 1 and 2: A Critical Analysis of Gandhi and K
Page 3 and 4: School Desegregation, 1957 41 Stude
Page 5 and 6: nonviolence as a form of struggle.
Page 7 and 8: Gandhi instead focused on those of
Page 9 and 10: Indian mine workers were violently
Page 11 and 12: to take: constitutionalism or milit
Page 13 and 14: these outbreaks, touring riot-torn
Page 15 and 16: egan in February 1928, primarily ag
Page 17 and 18: some 120,000 people were arrested.
Page 19 and 20: As the movement was set to begin, h
Page 21 and 22: In response to a recent effort by U
Page 23 and 24: “It is true that the controlled,
Page 25 and 26: Dominion status through constitutio
Page 27 and 28: It is no wonder that many critics o
Page 29 and 30: communist, who became renown for hi
Page 31 and 32: through which human misery, and esp
Page 33 and 34: “I have always been loathe to hid
Page 35 and 36: disobedience. It was also a conveni
Page 37 and 38: ended the civil disobedience moveme
Page 39 and 40: II. Martin Luther King and Civil Ri
Page 41 and 42: Southern Christian Leadership Confe
Page 43 and 44: campaign, and in December 1961 the
Page 45 and 46: SCLC's Birmingham Campaign, 1963 Bi
Page 47 and 48: inflexible bastion of segregation
Page 49: Beginning in June 1963, the movemen
Page 53 and 54: do very much, unless we keep the su
Page 55 and 56: Chicago Freedom Movement, 1966 Due
Page 57 and 58: the Black population did not embrac
Page 59 and 60: instigated numerous lethal assaults
Page 61 and 62: Fellowship on Reconciliation One of
Page 63 and 64: Rebellion in the Ranks: Pacifists w
Page 65 and 66: “The principal of self-defense, e
Page 67 and 68: major catalyst for government const
Page 69 and 70: optation involves some level of col
Page 71 and 72: Conclusion Pacifism must be challen

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