The Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Ilankai Tamil Sangam

that I haven’t voted in the election. It in turn would send
a wrong message to my Singhalese [friends] as we are
supporters of the LTTE. That would lead to intimidation
from the majority community. [Friday, 18 November,
2005]
That the Tamil leadership, the LTTE and the TNA, was of the
opinion that the Tamil people should ignore this presidential
election is no secret. They did make this quite clear to the Tamil
people, and backed it up with valid reasons, reasons that the
Tamil people understood. As leaders, it is in fact their civic-duty
to analyse the political situation affecting their people, and advice
them accordingly, which is what they did. But to say that they
intimidated them into a boycott is hyperbole.
If one wants to see real intimidation one should walk the streets
of Jaffna – hundreds of T-56 carrying Sinhala soldiers in full
public view patrolling, army observation posts at every junction,
mini army-camps every few hundred yards, heavy army vehicles
barrelling down the streets. Contrast this with the scenery in
Kilinochchi or Paranthan or any other LTTE controlled town,
where you don’t see a single gun in public.
To suggest that in the Sinhala army controlled Jaffna district
the LTTE was able to intimidate the people into doing anything
flies in the face of commonsense. As Tamilselvan rightly asked,
“how [could] the allegation of intimidation… be levelled against
the LTTE when the voters in question were living under the guns
of the occupying Sri Lankan forces? There are forty thousand
Sri Lankan troops in Jaffna alone exercising a clear intimidatory
presence…” [TamilNet, November 22, 2005]
In the same report, Tamilselvan also pointed out that “LTTE
members had long ago been withdrawn from SLA held areas
in the wake of Sri Lankan military intelligence supported
paramilitary attacks on them.”
Some LTTE supporters or a few local civilian leaders may have
gotten overenthusiastic about their leaders’ advice on this matter,
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