The Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Ilankai Tamil Sangam

the LTTE to deliver humanitarian aid and the measures it had
taken to undermine the LTTE’s negotiating capacity by weaving
a so called ‘safety net’. During the latter part of the Presidential
campaign, a senior member of the UNP was emboldened enough
to claim that arrangements were in place for US and Indian troops
to intervene should the LTTE defy Colombo.
Whereas Rajapakse presented himself as an ultra nationalist
Sinhalese, Wickramasinghe believed that he could be all things
to all men. To the international community he was the dove
ready to share power with the Tamils, to the Tamils he was the
moderate and to the Sinhalese (who were expected to read the
subtext hidden within his ostensibly moderate posturing) the
only man who could keep the Tamils in check with international
assistance.
Wickramasinghe failed because the Tamils saw through the
message and the majority of the Sinhalese preferred the direct
approach of Rajapakse.
As Ms Terista Schafer observes in her recent paper, “Posturing
for international support is no substitute for getting on with that
extremely difficult job” 6
The extremely difficult job of forging an enduring peace calls for
paradigm shifts by all of the players involved in this conflict.
And this includes the international community, India, the
regional power, the Sinhalese and the Tamils.
The International Community
The international community operates on the premise that there
is a moderate and hard line divide within the Sinhala polity. This
has led to regarding Wickramasinghe as the dove and Rajapakse
as the hawk. This is a flawed perception. While Wickramasinghe’s
support base is primarily the urbanised and westernised segment
of Sinhala society, it is wrong to conclude that this segment is
moderate in its outlook when it comes to conceding political
power to the Tamils.
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