The Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Ilankai Tamil Sangam

usually tends to be obfuscated in discussions on the structure of
the state, or on federal versus unitary constitutions, is that they
represent different aspects of the mindset of the ruling class in
Colombo. Whether we like it or not, the ruling class has within
itself substantial elements which are loath to share political power
with the Tamils through constitutional means. With Rajapakse
assuming the presidency, these elements have acquired great
legitimacy. What is more, no solution to the ethnic problem in
the future is going to be devoid of a substantial input from the
extreme nationalist sections of Sri Lanka’s southern population
and their political representatives.
It has been the ploy of the ruling class in Colombo to speak about
a consensus whenever it has had to take painful decisions of
sharing power with the Tamils. What is important in the building
of this consensus is that the JHU with nine seats is treated as
important as the UPFA (105 seats) and UNP (82 seats)! (The actual
influence of the JHU in getting Rajapakse elected as president
cannot be quantified, but it is unlikely to be substantial). The
question we have to ask is: why is the Sinhala polity, which
places faith in numbers and numerical majorities (as it does in
parliament) to defeat everything that affects its interests, bending
over backwards to solicit the opinion of the miniscule JHU? The
answer is obvious – to ensure that the intransigence of JHU (and
of course the JVP) could be used to dilute what is offered to the
Tamils as the ‘consensus opinion of the south,’ and thereby see
to it that hegemony does not slip out of the Sinhala ruling class.
The fact is that it is not the individual political parties that matter
when deciding what ought to be ‘conceded’ by the Colombo
political elite. It is the ruling class as a whole, which is reluctant
to share power, using the mechanisms built into the political
system to frustrate Tamil aspirations. This is not the first time
in the recent past that presidents have used the consensus
card to delay acting decisively. In 2000 for instance, former
president Chandrika Kumaratunga presented her proposal for
constitutional reform. For some months preceding this, active
negotiations were undertaken by the PA with the UNP to arrive
at a consensus. The upshot of it was the original draft readied in
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