The Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Ilankai Tamil Sangam

War or Peace
Appendix B
The only way to prevent war between the armed forces and LTTE
is to prevail on the new President to give up his idea of a unitary
form of government and work for a confederal
In his annual Heroes’ Day address on 27 November, the LTTE
supremo, Velupillai Pirapaharan, virtually served an ultimatum
on the new President, Mahinda Rajapakse, that if his government
did not come forward with a “reasonable solution” by the end of
this month, his organisation would intensify the struggle for a
separate Tamil Eelam in the New Year. It was the LTTE’s call to
the Tamils in the north-east to boycott the election that enabled
Rajapakse to become the President, albeit by the narrowest
margin. Although Rajapakse said his government was giving the
highest priority to the peace process, his options to find a solution
within the unitary form of government are limited.
His commitment to protect the unitary form of government in
vogue since independence, given in writing to the Left-wing
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the conservative Jathika Hela
Urumaya of the Buddhist clergy, ensured the support of the
majority Sinhala community to Rajapakse. The LTTE’s minimum
demand is acceptance of the Internal Self Governing Authority
(ISGA) proposals submitted by it two years ago as the starting
point for resuming negotiations. The Sri Lanka government and
the LTTE have taken up firm positions on two parallel lines.
Parallel lines never meet.
The Japanese government’s offer to host direct talks between
Colombo and the LTTE is welcome because neither side wanted
the talks to be held in each other’s territory. Norway’s compromise
proposal of holding the talks in the international airport near
Colombo was rejected by the LTTE as the venue was under
the effective control of the Sri Lankan government. What was
envisaged, according to Yasushi Akashi, Tokyo’s visiting special
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