Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

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1.2 Document Identification There are eight levels of assurance in this Certificate Policy, which are defined in subsequent sections. Each level of assurance has an OID, to be asserted in certificates issued by the RRCA and the CAs subordinate to the RRCA, which comply with the policy stipulations herein. The OIDs are registered under the id-infosec arc as follows: {iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1) Raytheon(1569) pki(10) certificatepolicy(1)} id-raytheon ::= 1.3.6.1.4.1.1569 id-pki ::= { id-Raytheon-10} id-certificate-policy ::= { id-pki-1} id-raytheon-high ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-1} id-raytheon-mediumHardware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-2} id-raytheon-mediumSoftware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-3} id-raytheon-mediumCBPHardware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-4} id-raytheon-mediumCBPSoftware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-5} id-raytheon-lowHardware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-6} id-raytheon-lowSoftware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-7} id-raytheon-SHA2-high ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-11} id-raytheon-SHA2-mediumHardware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-12} id-raytheon-SHA2-mediumSoftware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-13} id-raytheon-SHA-2-mediumCBPHardware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-14} id-raytheon-SHA2-mediumCBPSoftware ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-15} id-raytheon-test ::= {Raytheon-certificate-policy-20} Unless otherwise stated, a requirement stated in this CP applies to all assurance levels. All of the requirements for “id-raytheon-SHA2…..” are the same as those for the corresponding certificate policy OID without “SHA2-” in it except that the CAs not asserting “id-raytheon- SHA2…..” may use SHA-1 for generation of PKI objects such as certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses after December 31, 2010. For example: 14 7/25/2011
1. The CAs asserting id-raytheon-SHA2-highHardware must meet all the highHardware requirements stipulated in this CP; 2. The CAs asserting id-raytheon-SHA2-mediumHardware must meet all the mediumHardware requirements stipulated in this CP; 3. The CAs asserting id-raytheon-SHA2-mediumHardware use at least SHA-256 for end entity certificates issued after December 31, 2010; and 4. The CAs asserting id-raytheon-mediumHardware may use SHA-1 for end entity certificates issued after December 31, 2010. The requirements associated with the Medium CBP Software (commercial best practice) Assurance policy are identical to those defined for the Medium Software Assurance policy; with the exception of personnel security requirements (see Section 5.3.1). The requirements associated with the Medium CBP Hardware Assurance policy are identical to those defined for the Medium Hardware Assurance policy; with the exception of personnel security requirements (see Section 5.3.1). The Raytheon Root CA may issue certificates to other subordinate CAs, but the subordinate CAs must assert one of the certificate policies listed above.. The low assurance policy is for internal Raytheon company use only. This certificate shall not be trusted by any external entity. The low assurance certificate registration process will not be via In Person Authentication, but rather uses the Raytheon Corporate Directory Services for authentication per corporate policy. The test assurance policy is for issuance of test certificates that shall not be trusted by any relying party. 15 7/25/2011
Page 1 and 2: Raytheon Company Public Key Infrast
Page 3 and 4: Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ..
Page 5 and 6: 4.6.7 Notification of Certificate I
Page 7 and 8: 5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments ...
Page 9 and 10: 9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
Page 11 and 12: 1 INTRODUCTION This Certificate Pol
Page 13: 1.1.3 Scope The following diagram r
Page 17 and 18: approval of the PMA. The ROA activi
Page 19 and 20: � Raytheon employees and eligible
Page 21 and 22: 1.5 Policy Administration 1.5.1 Org
Page 23 and 24: 3.1 Naming 3 IDENTIFICATION & AUTHE
Page 25 and 26: establishing how the applicant is k
Page 27 and 28: 4. The Identity Verifier shall reco
Page 29 and 30: 3.3.1 Identification and Authentica
Page 31 and 32: For subscriber certificates, the pr
Page 33 and 34: 4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate
Page 35 and 36: 4.7.4 Notification of New Certifica
Page 37 and 38: Any CA may unilaterally revoke anot
Page 39 and 40: 4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs The
Page 41 and 42: 4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation an
Page 43 and 44: depart shall initial a sign-out she
Page 45 and 46: � Performing or overseeing intern
Page 47 and 48: � Be trustworthy; � Have no oth
Page 49 and 50: administrative documents (e.g., Adm
Page 51 and 52: REVOCATION PROFILE MANAGEMENT Audit
Page 53 and 54: It is acceptable for the system to
Page 55 and 56: 5.6 Key Changeover A CA uses a sign
Page 57 and 58: If a RA signature keys are compromi
Page 59 and 60: show that appropriate role separati
Page 61 and 62: Hashing: Cryptographic Function Has
Page 63 and 64: 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryp
Page 65 and 66:
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Management
Page 67 and 68:
� All hardware must be shipped or
Page 69 and 70:
7 CERTIFICATE, CRL AND OCSP PROFILE
Page 71 and 72:
When multiple values exist for an a
Page 73 and 74:
8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESS
Page 75 and 76:
9.1 Fees 9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL
Page 77 and 78:
� There are no material misrepres
Page 79 and 80:
� Ensure that certificate and rev
Page 81 and 82:
as a termination of this CP unless
Page 83 and 84:
enforce the agreement to arbitrate,
Page 85 and 86:
10 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP FORMA
Page 87 and 88:
Field Value Policy Mapping For SHA-
Page 89 and 90:
10.3 Raytheon Root CA Certificate (
Page 91 and 92:
91 7/25/2011
Page 93 and 94:
10.6 Medium Assurance Signing CA Ce
Page 95 and 96:
Field Value Entrust Version Info c=
Page 97 and 98:
10.9 Medium Assurance Code Signing
Page 99 and 100:
Field Value Entrust Version Info En
Page 101 and 102:
10.12 Medium Assurance Domain Contr
Page 103 and 104:
10.13 Medium Assurance Role Signatu
Page 105 and 106:
10.15 OCSP Responder Certificate Th
Page 107 and 108:
10.17 Medium Assurance CA CRL Forma
Page 109 and 110:
11 PKI REPOSITORY INTEROPERABILITY
Page 111 and 112:
BIBLIOGRAPHY The following document
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HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol IA
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13 GLOSSARY Access Ability to make
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Client (application) A system entit
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Non-Repudiation Assurance that the
Page 121 and 122:
other CA. (See superior CA). Subscr
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Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

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