Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

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4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request A request to suspend a certificate shall identify the certificate to be suspended, explain the reason for suspension, and allow the request to be authenticated (e.g., digitally or manually signed). The reason code CRL entry extension shall be populated with “certificateHold”. The Hold Instruction Code CRL entry extension shall be either absent or contain the OID for idholdinstruction-reject per RFC 3280. 4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period A certificate may only be suspended for up to 14 days. If the subscriber has not removed their certificate from hold (suspension) within that period, the certificate shall be revoked for reason of “Key Compromise”. In order to mitigate the threat of unauthorized person removing the certificate from hold, the subscriber identity shall be authenticated in person using initial identity proofing process described in Section 3.2.3 or using Human Subscriber Re-Authentication process described in Section 3.2.3.2. 4.10 Certificate Status Services The Raytheon PKI is not required to support certificate status services such as OCSP or SCVP. 4.10.1 Operational Characteristics Any operational characteristics of a CSA shall be described in the CSA’s CPS. 4.10.2 Service Availability Relying Parties are bound to their obligations and the stipulations of this CP irrespective of the availability of the certificate status service. 4.10.3 Optional Features No stipulation. 4.11 End Of Subscription Subscription is synonymous with the certificate validity period. The subscription ends when the certificate is revoked or expired. Certificates that have expired prior to or upon end of subscription are not required to be revoked. Unexpired CA certificates shall always be revoked at the end of subscription. 4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery 4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices Under no circumstances shall a CA or end entity signature key be escrowed by a third party. Raytheon’s key escrow and recovery capability shall be governed by the CertiPath Key Recovery Policy (KRP). The method, procedures and controls which will apply to the storage, request for extraction and/or retrieval, delivery protection and destruction of the requested copy of an escrowed key shall be described in the Raytheon Key Recovery Practice Statement (KRPS). 40 7/25/2011
4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices This CP neither requires nor prohibits the Raytheon PKI to have the capability of recovering session keys. If session keys are recoverable, a Key Recovery Policy (KRP) and a Key Recovery Practices Statement (KRPS) shall be developed. 41 7/25/2011
Page 1 and 2: Raytheon Company Public Key Infrast
Page 3 and 4: Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ..
Page 5 and 6: 4.6.7 Notification of Certificate I
Page 7 and 8: 5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments ...
Page 9 and 10: 9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
Page 11 and 12: 1 INTRODUCTION This Certificate Pol
Page 13 and 14: 1.1.3 Scope The following diagram r
Page 15 and 16: 1. The CAs asserting id-raytheon-SH
Page 17 and 18: approval of the PMA. The ROA activi
Page 19 and 20: � Raytheon employees and eligible
Page 21 and 22: 1.5 Policy Administration 1.5.1 Org
Page 23 and 24: 3.1 Naming 3 IDENTIFICATION & AUTHE
Page 25 and 26: establishing how the applicant is k
Page 27 and 28: 4. The Identity Verifier shall reco
Page 29 and 30: 3.3.1 Identification and Authentica
Page 31 and 32: For subscriber certificates, the pr
Page 33 and 34: 4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate
Page 35 and 36: 4.7.4 Notification of New Certifica
Page 37 and 38: Any CA may unilaterally revoke anot
Page 39: 4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs The
Page 43 and 44: depart shall initial a sign-out she
Page 45 and 46: � Performing or overseeing intern
Page 47 and 48: � Be trustworthy; � Have no oth
Page 49 and 50: administrative documents (e.g., Adm
Page 51 and 52: REVOCATION PROFILE MANAGEMENT Audit
Page 53 and 54: It is acceptable for the system to
Page 55 and 56: 5.6 Key Changeover A CA uses a sign
Page 57 and 58: If a RA signature keys are compromi
Page 59 and 60: show that appropriate role separati
Page 61 and 62: Hashing: Cryptographic Function Has
Page 63 and 64: 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryp
Page 65 and 66: 6.3 Other Aspects of Key Management
Page 67 and 68: � All hardware must be shipped or
Page 69 and 70: 7 CERTIFICATE, CRL AND OCSP PROFILE
Page 71 and 72: When multiple values exist for an a
Page 73 and 74: 8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESS
Page 75 and 76: 9.1 Fees 9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL
Page 77 and 78: � There are no material misrepres
Page 79 and 80: � Ensure that certificate and rev
Page 81 and 82: as a termination of this CP unless
Page 83 and 84: enforce the agreement to arbitrate,
Page 85 and 86: 10 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP FORMA
Page 87 and 88: Field Value Policy Mapping For SHA-
Page 89 and 90: 10.3 Raytheon Root CA Certificate (
Page 91 and 92:
91 7/25/2011
Page 93 and 94:
10.6 Medium Assurance Signing CA Ce
Page 95 and 96:
Field Value Entrust Version Info c=
Page 97 and 98:
10.9 Medium Assurance Code Signing
Page 99 and 100:
Field Value Entrust Version Info En
Page 101 and 102:
10.12 Medium Assurance Domain Contr
Page 103 and 104:
10.13 Medium Assurance Role Signatu
Page 105 and 106:
10.15 OCSP Responder Certificate Th
Page 107 and 108:
10.17 Medium Assurance CA CRL Forma
Page 109 and 110:
11 PKI REPOSITORY INTEROPERABILITY
Page 111 and 112:
BIBLIOGRAPHY The following document
Page 113 and 114:
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol IA
Page 115 and 116:
13 GLOSSARY Access Ability to make
Page 117 and 118:
Client (application) A system entit
Page 119 and 120:
Non-Repudiation Assurance that the
Page 121 and 122:
other CA. (See superior CA). Subscr
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Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

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