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Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

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Medium-CBPsoftware<br />

Medium-hardware<br />

or Medium-CBPhardware<br />

High-hardware<br />

consequences of data compromise are moderate. This may<br />

include transactions having substantial monetary value or risk of<br />

fraud, or involving access to private information where the<br />

likelihood of malicious access is substantial. Subscriber private<br />

keys are stored in software at this assurance level.<br />

This level is relevant to environments where risks and<br />

consequences of data compromise are moderate. This may<br />

include transactions having substantial monetary value or risk of<br />

fraud, or involving access to private information where the<br />

likelihood of malicious access is substantial. Subscriber private<br />

keys are stored in hardware at this assurance level.<br />

This level is relevant to environments where risks and<br />

consequences of data compromise are high. This may include<br />

transactions having high monetary value or risk of fraud, or<br />

involving access to private information where the likelihood of<br />

malicious access is high. Subscriber private keys are stored in<br />

hardware at this assurance level.<br />

1.3.6.1 Factors in Determining Usage<br />

The Relying Party must first determine the level of assurance required for an application, and<br />

then select the certificate appropriate for meeting the needs of that application. This shall be<br />

determined by evaluating various risk factors including the value of the information, the threat<br />

environment, and the existing protection of the information environment. These determinations<br />

are made by the Relying Party and are not controlled by the RPMA or the <strong>Raytheon</strong> Operational<br />

Authority. Nonetheless, this CP contains some helpful guidance, set forth herein, which Relying<br />

Parties may consider in making their decisions.<br />

1.3.6.2 Obtaining <strong>Certificate</strong>s<br />

This CP requires publication and access to CA certificates and CRL. This CP imposes no<br />

requirements in terms of publication and access to end entity (i.e., subscriber) certificates. The<br />

relying party applications must make their own agreement for obtaining the subscriber<br />

certificates. This could be trivially done for signature applications by including the signer<br />

certificate in the application protocol. For encryption applications, the relying party must<br />

develop a means to access subscriber certificates. Use of X.500 and LDAP Repositories is one<br />

way to achieve this, but this or no mechanism is mandated by this CP.<br />

1.4 <strong>Certificate</strong> Usage<br />

1.4.1 Appropriate <strong>Certificate</strong> Uses<br />

<strong>Certificate</strong>s asserting a <strong>Policy</strong> OID defined in this document shall only be used for transactions<br />

related to <strong>Raytheon</strong> business in accordance with <strong>Raytheon</strong> policy. CAs must state this<br />

requirement in their CPS and impose a requirement on Subscribers to abide by this limitation.<br />

1.4.2 Prohibited <strong>Certificate</strong> Uses<br />

See section 1.4.1 above.<br />

20 7/25/2011

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