Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

6.2.4.3 CSA Private Key Backup
If backed up, the CSA private signature keys shall be backed up under the same single or multiperson
control as the signature key is invoked. A single backup copy of the signature key may
be stored at or near the CSA location. A second backup copy may be kept at the CSA backup
location. Procedures for CSA private signature key backup shall be included in the appropriate
CPS.
6.2.5 Private Key Archival
Private signature keys shall not be archived by the CA.
6.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module
CA and CSA private keys shall be generated by and remain in a cryptographic module. The CA
and CSA private keys may be backed up in accordance with Section 6.2.4.1.
6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module
The cryptographic module may store Private Keys in any form as long as the keys are not
accessible without authentication mechanism that is in compliance with FIPS 140-1/2 rating of
the cryptographic module.
6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key
The user must be authenticated to the cryptographic module before the activation of any private
key(s). Acceptable means of authentication include but are not limited to pass-phrases, PINs or
biometrics. Entry of activation data shall be protected from disclosure (i.e., the data should not
be displayed while it is entered).
6.2.9 Methods of Deactivating Private Key
The cryptographic modules that have been activated shall not be left unattended or otherwise
available to unauthorized access. After use, the cryptographic module shall be deactivated,
e.g., via a manual logout procedure, or automatically after a period of inactivity as defined in the
applicable CPS. Hardware cryptographic modules shall be removed and stored in a secure
container when not in use.
6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key
Private signature keys shall be destroyed when they are no longer needed, or when the
certificates to which they correspond expire or are revoked. For software cryptographic
modules, this can be overwriting the data. For hardware cryptographic modules, this will likely
be executing a “zeroize” command. Physical destruction of hardware should not be required.
6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating
See Section 6.2.1.
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