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Raytheon Company Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Policy

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Hashing:<br />

Cryptographic<br />

Function<br />

Hashing Algorithm for<br />

<strong>Certificate</strong>s<br />

Hashing Algorithm for<br />

CRLs<br />

Hashing Algorithm for<br />

Pre-signed OCSP<br />

Responses<br />

Hashing Algorithm for<br />

Other (i.e., not presigned)<br />

OCSP<br />

Responses<br />

Issued on or<br />

before 12/31/2010<br />

Issued after<br />

12/31/2010 but<br />

before 12/31/2030<br />

SHA-1 SHA-224 or SHA-<br />

256<br />

Issued after<br />

12/31/2030<br />

SHA-256<br />

SHA-1 SHA-1 7 SHA-256<br />

SHA-1 SHA-1 8 SHA-256<br />

SHA-1 SHA-224 or SHA-<br />

256<br />

SHA-256<br />

CSAs shall use the same signature algorithms, key sizes, and hash algorithms as used by the<br />

CA to sign the certificate in question. However CRLs and pre-signed OCSP responses can be<br />

signed using SHA-1 at all assurance levels.<br />

Using compensating controls on the SHA-1 hashing algorithm increases the effective bit<br />

strength to 80 bits and allows it to be effectively used through the end of 2013. The<br />

compensating controls employed introduce validity entropy (randomness) into the unused and<br />

least significant bits of the validity date fields.<br />

As an exception to all of the other assertions in this section, CAs not asserting “id-raytheon-<br />

SHA2-…..” series certificate policy OID(s) may continue to use SHA-1 for issuing end entity<br />

certificates after 12/31/2010. OCSP Responders that only provide “certificate revocation status”<br />

of certificates that do not possess “id-raytheon-SHA2-…..” certificate policy OIDs, may use<br />

SHA-1 for all OCSP response types, not just for pre-signed.<br />

After 12/31/2010, CAs operatingi 9 at medium and high assurance shall only act on certificate<br />

requests to sign using the SHA-1 hashing algorithm if all of the following conditions are met:<br />

1. The certificate request is generated/created by a trusted entity (e.g., RA, CA, or CSA);<br />

and<br />

2. The certificate request is securely submitted by a trusted entity.<br />

6.1.6 <strong>Public</strong> <strong>Key</strong> Parameters Generation and Quality Checking<br />

RSA keys shall be generated in accordance with ANSI X9.31. Prime numbers for RSA shall be<br />

generated or tested for primality in accordance with ANSI X9.80.<br />

ECDSA and ECDH keys shall be generated in accordance with FIPS 186-2. Curves from FIPS<br />

186-3 shall be used.<br />

7<br />

<strong>Raytheon</strong> may decide to transition to stronger hash algorithm earlier than 12/31/2030.<br />

8<br />

<strong>Raytheon</strong> may decide to transition to stronger hash algorithm earlier than 12/31/2030.<br />

9<br />

A CA is considered operating at an assurance level, if it has been issued a certificate for that assurance<br />

level or is issuing certificates at that assurance level.<br />

61 7/25/2011

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