The non-intervention in other state’s internal affairs did, however, presume that all states respectthe moral values and internally behave accordingly. 56 Barnett identifies this behaviour as “a gapbetween empathy and action, between knowledge and denial.” 57 Nevertheless, the constantincreasing globalisation of both econ<strong>om</strong>ics and politics suggest that this traditional view must bereplaced with one more adapted to global responsibility in securing global stability. 58 Lookingback to the first international security organisation, the League of Nations, this behaviour will betraced in the discussions regarding the Armenian massacres, concerning whether or not a foreignstate had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ott<strong>om</strong>an Turkey, and how “morallysane” Turkey was depicted as in the reports of the Swedish representatives.Taking into account the above mentioned role of the bystander, it is safe to assert that thebystander is always a part of the dynamics of the genocide and therefore, to s<strong>om</strong>e extent, alsoresponsible for the course of events. But what can the bystander do? What alternatives does aforeign state or the world c<strong>om</strong>munity have for intervention? What amount or kind of power isneeded for such an intervention? It is quite clear that in order to answer the main question, oneshould consider a c<strong>om</strong>plex mixture of several different factors in every specific case.Research indicates that bystanders, even if they can not halt a genocide, can nevertheless exerts<strong>om</strong>e influence. However, it is the silence of the bystander which inflicts the main harm,signalling the perpetrator that no one will intervene. Ervin Staub argues:We cannot expect bystanders to sacrifice their lives for others. But we can expect individuals,groups, and nations to act early along a continuum of destruction, when the danger to themselvesis limited, and the potential exists for inhibiting the evolution of increasing destructiveness. 59In addition to governments, non-governmental organisations, institutions and c<strong>om</strong>panies canalso exhort pressure on the perpetrator in order to stop or reduce the ongoing massacres and actsof cruelty. However, it seems that these organisations and institutions behave quite in theopposite manner: banks and other business, instead of using their contacts to exert pressure uponthe perpetrator, actually move to profit fr<strong>om</strong> the situation, which could further encourage theperpetrator. 60Lack of knowledge and intelligence information is one the most important factors, andexcuses, used by the bystanders to be acquitted fr<strong>om</strong> accusations of passivity and indifference.But research indicates that most often the massacres and the annihilation, even though s<strong>om</strong>ewhatdelayed, are known to the outside world and still the bystanders choose either to pretend thatthey are unaware or simply ignore the news. Moral duties and pursuing justice internationallysimply, quite obviously and naturally, fall short of in c<strong>om</strong>parison to self-preservation and national56 Mansbach and Wilmer, 2001, p. 63. Also see Simpson, 1995, p. 10; Staub, Oxford, 2002, p. 26.57 Barnett, 2000, p. 58.58 Shaw, 1994, p. 187-189. Also see Campbell, 2005, p. 153-154.59 Staub, Oxford, 2002, p. 27-28, 35-36. Also see Grünfeld and Huijbo<strong>om</strong>, 2007, p. 255.60 Barnett, 2000, p. 53; Staub, Oxford, 2002, p.492-493.16
interests. Despite his famous “14 points”, championing the right to national self-deter<strong>min</strong>ation,the US President Wilson did not quite equate the priority of justice with that of order. He didneither push for these principles in general nor did he fulfil his initial idea of extending Americanprotection over the Armenians. Moreover, even if the President would have followed throughwith his principles, the American people would not have supported him in assu<strong>min</strong>gresponsibilities beyond their border. This was well displayed with a kind of “moral anaesthesia”which the Americans adopted during the 1920s and 1930s in regard to international affairs. Thisrhetoric repeated itself during the Second World War, when President Roosevelt, despite obviousknowledge about the Nazi mass killings of Jews, refused to believe the scale of the massacres. Inregard to Washington’s lack of knowledge about the Nazi plans back in 1942, Raphael Lemkinwrote: “I thought: genocide is so easy to dismiss because people do not believe it until after ithappens”. 61 John L. Gaddis, however, does not believe that it was lack of knowledge thatrestrained them fr<strong>om</strong> intervening, but rather unwillingness to engage in any operation which didnot have a direct impact on the war efforts. Reluctant to forward the received news in 1942 aboutthe annihilation of Jews, Elbridge Dubrow, Chief of the European Division of the US StateDepartment, crossed out the news with the instruction “Do not send, E.D.” In a memorandumhe explained the undesirability of the news due to the “fantastic nature of the allegation.” 62 Thisembodied the informed, but an indifferent world which hesitated to intervene. The internationalc<strong>om</strong>munity did not consider the massacres an issue of high priority c<strong>om</strong>pared to the ongoing war.And even though the above mentioned episode is fr<strong>om</strong> the WWII, as it will be shown later, it ishighly representative for the attitude displayed towards the Armenians during WWI.It is safe to contend that there were different kinds of indifference: those who did not care atall; those who felt sympathy in silence; and those who were indifferent due to military, political orecon<strong>om</strong>ic interests. The latter group choose indifference as a tactic to be kept outside theproblem while benefiting fr<strong>om</strong> the relationship with the perpetrator. 63 The task in this paper willpartly be to identify whether the role of bystander, i.e. an informed yet passive observer whorefrained fr<strong>om</strong> any actions in spite of the knowledge regarding the atrocities, applies to theSwedish society and the Swedish actors. Could the Swedish missionaries, dipl<strong>om</strong>ats and militaryrepresentatives be regarded as bystanders? Were the Swedish Society, Church, and Governmentbystanders to the event? And finally, can Sweden’s behaviour in regard to the Armenian questionbe regarded as one of a bystander? Using the role of the bystander at different levels is the basisfor understanding how a small neutral state such as Sweden could have acted in response to theArmenian massacres.61 Lemkin, 2002, p. 383. For the Rwanda case see Grünfeld and Huijbo<strong>om</strong>, 2007, p. 165.62 Gaddis, 2003, p. 158-159. Hilberg, 1992, p. 249, 253. Barnett too points the factor of isolationism as a reasonfor a society’s apathy in regard to world events. See Barnett, 2000, p. 50-51.63 Barnett. 2000, p. 122-123.17
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skin was totally scorched. Another
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which her recurrently emphasised th
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The sooner calls referring to the A
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Despite these facts, Armenia was th
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Svenska Riksarkivet [Swedish Nation
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Bakhtiari, Kalla det vad fan du vil
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Chan, Steve and Drury, Cooper A., S
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Moranian, Suzanne Elizabeth, Bearin