SEVEN PAPERS ON EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS ... - Wagner College

IV. Human Being and Existence: The Beginnings of an Existential Psychology (1995)
first published in Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry Psychiatry 22(1-3),
(dated) 1990-91, pp. 116-140.
Note: This article is the most theoretically comprehensive of the series. It presents the foundations
of clinical practice recounted in the preceding and following essays.
_______________________________________________________
The following examines the meaning of the terms human being and existence (what Heidegger
termed Da-sein), which constitutes the singular feature of human be-ing (Seiende). The
distinction is basic for understanding what I mean by the existential validation of one human
being by an other (1). Taken together, these observations are an exercise in phenomenological
method (2).
First some terminological considerations. The meaning of existence is beingconsciousness.
Though the formulation being-consciousness feels awkward, it is accurate. Its sense will become
clear in the exposition that follows. Consciousness is awareness of things in the way that is
peculiar to the living being that each of us is. That is to say, it is based on our being related to
things mediated by meanings which we assign them. By contrast, animals such as dogs or cats
are in an unalterable connection with things that is fixed by instinct (3). The term existential
consciousness or validating consciousness names the mode of consciousness which someone is
when confronted by the existence of another human being.
A. Existence, Human Being and Temporality
Only the human sort of be-ing both is and exists. While other things only are, human beings also
exist (4). Our double ontological status sets us apart from everything else. My body is, but I exist.
My body is something on hand and has a place among the things of nature, which along with
things fabricated by human beings, imaginary and mental things, and existence comprise all
there is.
For the human sort of be-ing, his what he is and his existence are not equivalent. They are
not coterminous. They do not overlap. One consequence of this is that a human being's own
existence eludes him. As we shall see, he requires others to validate his existence and in that way
make it known to him.
Access to what one is occurs via the opening of his existence to others. One's being
comprises what he has done and what he can become. His particular past (what he has done)
and its possible future (what he is free to become) together comprise the twofold sense in which
he is. Only he is in the privileged position of having direct and immediate access to his past and
its future. Others know about what he is only as observers who make inferences about his past
and what he might become.
Each of us is more or less able to testify to what he is. The capacity to do so varies with
the circumstances of our lives. The emergence of my being, insofar as I am aware of it and know
something about it, is called experience. An other learns of my experience only through my
testimony (unless by inference, which usually is not trustworthy). The other cannot say what I am
in my entirety, nor can he be sure about what I am capable of doing (my possibilities for action).
The other has access only to my body and to what I say and do, yet it is just in here in
relation to my body, its performances and what I say that he is in a position to validate my
existence. I cannot do this myself. Without such validation, I do not know that I exist, which is