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SEVEN PAPERS ON EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS ... - Wagner College

SEVEN PAPERS ON EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS ... - Wagner College

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consciousness is not a unified power. It is not one thing, as traditional psychology had taught.<br />

The structure, and hence the nature, of being-consciousness varies with what claims its attention,<br />

takes as its object, and thereby has as its content. These are different modes of beingconsciousness,<br />

not states of consciousness.<br />

Being-consciousness attends to what confronts it (13). It is the very relation between its<br />

acts and its objects. The structure of the relation varies with the kind of object of which there is<br />

consciousness (idea, percepts, images, memories, and so on). Acts of imagining consciousness,<br />

for example, are therefore structurally different from acts of perceiving consciousness or acts of<br />

recollecting consciousness. This may be summarized by saying that being-consciousness is<br />

intentional; that is, it has the structure of a relation determined by the nature of the object of<br />

which there is consciousness.<br />

Phenomenology has endeavored to study the kinds of relations of being-consciousness in<br />

their pure state before they are distorted by the interpretation language invariably imposes on<br />

them. It seeks to recover the data recognized and studied by academic psychologists, but in<br />

their original form, purified as much as possible of the prejudicial ways of seeing the acts and<br />

contents of being-consciousness that the natural scientific point of view introduces. According<br />

to Husserl, being-consciousness is always concrete, but after linguistic interpretation, which<br />

always effects an abstracting (that is to say, symbolizing) transformation, the data of beingconsciousness<br />

are deprived of their concreteness. Language, above all, produces such<br />

abstractions of the concrete data of consciousness.<br />

The consciousness I am with regard to my being differs from the being-consciousness an<br />

other is with regard to my being. With this distinction the question of my existence opens up for<br />

psychology. The question for existential psychology then becomes my experience of the other's<br />

existence and pari passu the other's experience of my existence. My own relation of<br />

consciousness to my own being occurs with respect to one dimension of what I am: my future.<br />

Consciousness of my past is therefore accessible only as directed toward this future and occurs<br />

in the form of what we call recollection. Consciousness of my future as such occurs in the form<br />

of desiring and wishing, fantasizing and reverie, all of which are forms of willing (14).<br />

Only the other can be consciousness of my present. One's consciousness of an other's<br />

existence has its own characteristic acts. As we will see, existence is an object for one's<br />

consciousness unlike any other.<br />

G. Consciousness of Existence and Validation of the Other<br />

When an other is consciousness of my existence, he is consciousness of nothing between us. That<br />

is to say, his consciousness of my existence is of nothing that I am; it is not consciousness of<br />

anything I am, of any part of my being. It is simply consciousness of this very absence of<br />

something between his existence and my existence (15). The key to understanding this, of<br />

course, is that for Heidegger and existential analysts, “nothing” is precisely the fons et origoo of<br />

possibilities.<br />

Initially in everyday life, the other comes face to face with my existence and I with hers,<br />

but on those occasions there is usually a great deal in fact between us, including in particular<br />

the body each of us is, as well a host of preconcpetions, recollections and the like. Existential<br />

encounter begins on this basis. When an other's consciousness of my existence dominates his<br />

awareness, however, all of the things on hand between us except, including especially our<br />

bodies tend to take on exaggerated importance. Soon there is literally everything between the<br />

two of us and the nothing of each other's existence is lost sight of. This determinate though<br />

ordinarily inexplicit plenum consists of everything on hand between us with which we may<br />

occupy ourselves. The things we handle, arrange, and use are the places where our acts of<br />

being-consciousness meet and intersect. Things are places where what I am meets what the<br />

other is. We meet chiefly at the things we most immediately are, namely, our bodies.

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