SEVEN PAPERS ON EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS ... - Wagner College

odies belong to them. By contrast, the existing human being belongs to his body, the body he
is (where "is" is used in the transitive sense) (6).
The body he is is the body to which he belongs, which possesses him. We must not forget,
however, that at the same time, a human being also has his body, a body which in its workings is
always strange and in a certain sense anonymous. The body a human being has has a past. Like
existence, the future of that body's past is always precarious, a "touch and go" matter for any of
us. Anxiety is one's experience of the future of the body he has. As such, it is an essential part of
human life.
A human being has direct access only to the body he has, the body that has a certain
feeling of balance and heaviness, but not to the body he is (the “lived body”). The body he is
(including his posture and style of moving, for example) is open directly only to others. For this
reason, an other's account of my body never jibes with my own experience of my body (the
body I have). The result of this is a discrepancy between what I know about my body (my "body
image"), which determines the way I see it, and what others know about me as I am embodied.
The way an other treats my body, therefore, always produces in me a somewhat uncanny
feeling.
C. Validation of Existence
To repeat, the human sort of be-ing both exists and is. As an instance of that sort of be-ing, each
of us is in the unique position of requiring an other to establish his personal present, while in turn
providing the other with his own (the other's) present. Only on this basis does each one of us then
have a past and a future. One's sense of his personal present – the emergence of his present – is
dependent upon others. It is crucial during infancy, when existence is first conferred on an
individual. In this sense, mutual dependency is the basis of the human ethos. As Martin Buber
said: In the beginning was the we.”
How is a human being's existence validated by others? What is the nature of a human
being's awareness of the emergence of his personal present? These questions dominate the
present study. But how can we deny someone the direct responsibility for his own present? For
that is implied by what has been said. Can I trust Others with my existence? I do, because I must.
There is no choice here, for lacking validation, I will not exist and the question of trust will never
come up. An infant whose existence is not validated becomes very peculiar, if it survives at all.
Anaclitic depression ("hospitalism") and infantile autism are examples of the outcome of lack of
initial validation during the early months of life.
A child whose existence has not been consistently validated (and this must have
occurred at least minimally unless he has been reared apart from human beings) accumulates a
past nonetheless – and that past will have its possible future – but when he attempts to speak
out of what he is to those who speak to him, such a child's attempts falter. He may never speak,
or may speak in a way that fails to symbolize his experience adequately.
An infant is validated by what others do and say to him, what they "make of him." Yet,
after all is said and done, even the optimally validated human being exists as a stranger to
others, since each existence is, one might say, like a distinct historical era, remote and yet
uncannily familiar. The source of our inevitable strangeness to each other is our temporal
uniqueness. When we meet, each of us discovers the other's temporally unique present.
As an other to any other, in each instance I speak to his existence. How do I recognize
the stranger as "one of us," as likely a human being? I take a chance every time. I believe the
animal body before me harbors an existence. I am nearly always confirmed, even by an
inarticulate infant who confirms my existence with its human gaze. No animal looks at me that
way.
During the early weeks and months of life, my past makes its first appearance in the
reflection that presents to me an image of my face on the surface of the mothering person's