black sea

this period, the French military industry struggled
to secure some orders. Thus, since the spring of
1913 Schneider-Creusot intensified its efforts to
secure in her favour orders of machine guns from
the Romanian government and against the
German Krupp. It coupled that effort by financing
various campaigns in the Romanian press against
the German products. 45
Another French company Saint-Chamond
struggled to secure an order for 4 Romanian
destroyers in her favour and against Krupp. 46 On
the eve of World War I the competition between
the French and German military industry goes on
relentlessly in the country. However, the German
primacy in the arms sector is indisputable. The
possibility of selling to the Romanian army 10
artillery units by the French Schneider in June
1914 cannot be considered as success when the
reorganization of that army demanded the buying
of 120 artillery units that would be ordered to
German industry. 47
Conclusion
A few years before the World War I, the military
industrial and generally the political antagonism
of France and Germany in the Balkans and
particularly Greece and Romania consists an
important chapter not only for the European
historical reality, but also for the local history of
Southeast Europe.
This antagonism besides its political and
diplomatic formation that, of course, originated
from the French-German collision of 1870-71 and
the creation of the Bismarck system in Europe
took, from the end of the XIX th century and
particularly the beginning of the XX th century, a
more concrete financial and also industrial
economic shape.
Apart from the fact that the foreign policy of
the two countries, France and Germany, was not
always considered identical with the policy of the
financial credit and banking cycles of these
countries, which of course pushed forward
common efforts and initiatives for mutual benefit,
soon this financial weapon was to be used directly
or indirectly for its promotion, as well as for specific
economical interests.
The value of this weapon was known to both
governments. Their capability to provide or deny
the permit for investing foreign bonds in their
national money market gave them the power to
embody this factor as a crucial element of their
foreign policy. Thus, the permit could be followed
by the desire of obtaining economic advantages
and political exchanges.
In the case we have reported but generally also
in the matter of foreign borrowing, as much as in
the Balkans as in the Ottoman Empire, the
collaboration between the banks of the two sides
for pure technical reasons –particularly that is the
protection of the clients-investors from probable
risk of bankrupt of the borrowers – was accepted
by both governments. 48
This collaboration was of course as it appeared
especially in the case of Romania, mostly desirable
from the bank foundations of both sides that were
also involved for reasons of common financial profit.
However, from the end of the XIX th century,
the promotion of industrial orders started to play a
more significant role in the contracts of foreign
loans. The German banks, which were closely
connected with certain industrial centers of their
country, were trying to push forward and ensure
more orders for their national industry from the
countries that borrowed.
The financial weapon would be used by the
French with a particularly pressing way and mainly
with the stimulation of the French Foreign Affairs
Office and it is obvious that this tactic proved itself
quite effective in many cases. The principal
doctrine: the orders must be made to the industries
and companies of the country that covered
financially the loan.
The harsh antagonism of the two important
war industries – the German Krupp and the French
Schneider – as much as in Turkey as in the Balkans
and of course in the countries that have caught
our interest, the support of the correlating
governments and the implication of bank cycles
consists a characteristic example.
Foe several years prior to World War I, Greece
and Romania became the theater of this strong
political-military and economical antagonism.
From the beginning of the XX th century, Greece
enrolled gradually in the French influence sphere
due to the French capital, that flooded the country
and by the principle of “coherent loan”, meaning as
mentioned previously, the obligation of the country
that borrows to order industrial products from the
lending country’s industries, a great number of
military materials purchases were made in France.
On the contrary, Romania traditionally under
the financial and economic influence of Germany
would turn to the latter for covering her military
42 ����� Review of Military History �����