black sea

1933, ample manifestations took place in Greece
commemorating the great naval victories in the
War of Independence. The ship “Constanţa” was
invited to take part to these manifestations, alongside
a British cruiser. During the three days of the
event, there took place boat races, swimming competitions
and other sailor games. A dinner was offered
in the honor of the foreign fleets. The Greek
Minister of Navy, Hadjikyriakos, visited the Romanian
ship, being saluted by its commandant, cmdr.
Al. Dumitrescu. The Minister of Navy declared, as
the Romanian representative in Athens reported,
that he is happy to see the representatives of the
Romanian fleet attending the Greek navy manifestations,
thus illustrating the friendship between
the two countries, “which are united by everything
and divided by nothing”. 8
Coming back to the general situation, we notice
that in the autumn of 1933 the political contacts
intensified, including those at the highest
level, the main topic of discussions being the setting
up of the Balkan Pact. This issue was also
discussed during the reunion of the Little Entente
in Zagreb (January 22-23, 1934), where the final
attempt to draw Bulgaria was decided, on the occasion
of the visit in Romania of Czar Boris (January
25-28, 1934). This final attempt, however, had no
results.
On February 9, 1934, the Foreign Ministers of
Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey signed
in Athens the Balkan Pact. The essence of the
pact was contained in the first two articles: “Romania,
Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece mutually
guarantee the security of all their borders in the
Balkans” (art. 1). “The High Contracting Parties
commit themselves to focus on the measures of
dealing with certain situations that could affect
their interests, as they are defined by the present
agreement. They commit themselves not to undertake
any political action towards any other nonsignatory
Balkan country of the present agreement,
without prior mutual notice, and not to take
any political obligation towards any other Balkan
country without the consent of the other contracting
parties” (art. 2). The agreement was accompanied
by an “annexed protocol”, which referred,
among others, to: the non-aggressive and open
nature of the alliance; the possibility of enforcing
the pact even if the aggressor was from outside
Balkans; the signing of the conventions “with similar
goals to the ones pursued by the Balkan Pact”
(military conventions); the maintaining of the territorial
statu-quo, etc. Another important feature
was the reservation formulated by Turkey and recorded
in the secret annex of the Pact, in which it
in no way admitted to be considered as committing
itself to take part in actions directed against the
Soviet Union. 9
The alliance had three periods in its development:
during the first, until mid 1936, each member
defined its positions; the second, until the end
of 1938, was the phase of actual military collaboration;
the third, during 1938-1940, was marked by
the weakening of the solidarity and the reduction
in the military cooperation.
A lot of energy was put in the first phase and
the negotiations proved difficult as a consequence
of the different geopolitical situation of the various
signatory states. Thus, the common denominator
had to be found for states with a Mediterranean
calling (Turkey or Greece) and for others with a
central-continental inclination (Romania). It was
also necessary to eliminate or at least to dampen
the major differences resulted from prior political
agreements. We mentioned the case of Turkey.
Greece found itself in a similar situation, the authorities
in Athens stating that, by fulfilling its commitments
from the Pact, they cannot go to war
against one of the great powers under any circumstance.
The Black Sea issue was the main point of interest
of Turkey and Romania, both littoral states,
Greece paying more attention to the situation in
the Mediterranean Sea, where it had to face Italy’s
hegemonic tendencies. That is why the tripartite
military convention (Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey)
was first finalized.
During the tripartite talks, certain differences
in the opinions surfaced out concerning the number
of forces allocated to the Balkan theater of
war and the area of concentration of the large
Romanian units for the action against Bulgaria.
Therefore, Turkey, starting from its superior potential
of mobilization and from the existence of a
single enemy on a frontier of about 100 km, was
demanding the concentration of an army of 30
divisions, each ally participating with an equal number
of troops. Ankara’s option was determined by
the fear of an Italian action in the Eastern Mediterranean,
an area where most troops would have
been deployed. Romania, having in mind its strategic
situation – all its borders being quasi-concentri-
58 ����� Review of Military History �����