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1 7 4 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Volume 41 / Issue 2biblical tradition. The philosopher is challenged by faith just as much as theman of faith is challenged by philosophy: “How can the faithful overcomethe risk of self-deception?” writes Lomax. “How can they be sure the Godthey worship corresponds to the true Lord of the universe? …How can onewho presumes to live a life of reason know that the life of faith is not infinitelysuperior? How, indeed, can a philosopher achieve certainty that thephilosophic life is not self-destructively based on faith, even an inferior kindof faith?” (45). Lomax approaches the question phenomenologically, boring“through the crust of prejudices and presuppositions left by millennia ofinstitutions and traditions” (46). This is necessary if we are to recover thetrue challenge of the biblical tradition—precisely because it is still, in somesense, our tradition we may find it difficult to approach it clearly. Lomaxwrites for philosophers, who “must face the possibility that the Bible is true”and that philosophy “is a forbidden rebellion against God and…a drasticallyinferior form of existence compared to the life of faith” (60). Lomax allowsthe reader to glimpse a biblical tradition that challenges philosophy in a waythat we contemporaries, because of what we consider our familiarity withthat tradition, cannot always do. Both the contemporary atheist who rejectsreligion simply and the contemporary descendants of Thomas Aquinas 2 whoperhaps underplay the tensions between reason and revelation will benefitfrom Lomax’s insightful essay, which has the virtue of presenting the biblicalchallenge to philosophy in a stronger and deeper light than is commonlydone today.James H. Nichols Jr. takes up the question of whether and how we canthink of Tacitus as a philosophic writer (“On the Philosophic Character ofTacitus’s Imperial Histories”). While one might simply accord this statusto Tacitus on the grounds that thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu,and Gibbon held him in high regard, Nichols understands thatsuch a view is unfashionable today, and that it requires that a more strenuousargument be made for it. Nichols argues that Tacitus is a philosophicwriter interested in pursuing the truth while being aware that “truth hasbeen impaired in many ways,” including the ignorance of public affairs andthe distorting effects of flattery toward or hatred of imperial masters. TheTacitean account “refers to human passions in their reaction to masters, thatis, imperial rulers. …The concern for historical truth already points towardhis inquiry into political forms and moral traits.” Tacitus wants to elucidate“the causes and reasons of things” (67). Tacitus does so without partisan zeal,2This, of course, is not to say that St. Thomas underplays the tension. As any serious reader of Aquinaswell knows, he is attuned to the difficulties.