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2 1 6 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Volume 41 / Issue 3that each part of the soul is capable of (586d–587a). As he reads the divisionof persons into three types, so he reads this passage as applying to the classstructure in Kallipolis and not just to the internal rule of the wisdom lover.Thus, thanks to philosophic rule, all citizens of Kallipolis enjoy the greatestsustainable happiness of which they are capable, given the kind of people theyare, and the city is therefore happy as a whole. 31Reeve’s interpretation fundamentally rests on the assumption that a fewcrucial passages in book 9 are applicable to the workings of Kallipolis. Acloser look at the text reveals, however, that the passages in question do notsupport Reeve’s interpretation of them.It is highly questionable to assume that the division of types in book 9is meant to be read back into the class structure of Kallipolis, given the lackof any explicit statement to that effect. 32 Even if we grant this point, however,and even if we further grant that each class therefore has a characteristicform of happiness, the text still does not let us conclude with any confidencethat, in Kallipolis, the lower classes are ruled in such a way that their happinessis maximized. The passage that Reeve relies upon to establish this claim(586d–587a) is not a passage about political rule; it is, rather, a passage abouthow philosophers govern their own souls, the notion being that a personwho is wise knows how to provide what is best for all of his soul. 33 Reeve’sposition is based on the assumption that the account of the philosopher’srule over himself can also be analogously applied to the rule of philosophersover the other classes in the city. There are, however, several parts of the textthat render this assumption problematic. We may note, for example, thatwhenever Socrates introduces some institution or policy while building thecity, it is always with a view to making the members of the various classes asgood as possible at their particular jobs. That is what justifies the education ofthe guardians, as well as their lack of private property and privacy (see 378c,416a–417b). That is the motive for introducing great honors for the guardians(414a). That is what justifies forbidding the producers to become too rich or31“The unity of the Kallipolis requires…maximal universal happiness” (ibid., 204).32It has the result, for example, that Reeve must implausibly argue that the producers possess oligarchicsouls, even though the descriptions of the many in Kallipolis (for example, 431b–c) presentthem as a rather variegated bunch, nothing like the grubby, fearful miser that is the oligarchic man(553a–555a) (see Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 48 and 285n2). Overall, I believe Ferrari has proved thatthe individual psychological types cannot be read into the class structure of Kallipolis; see Ferrari,City and Soul, 42–50, 65–75.33This claim is reiterated at the end of book 9 (591a–592a), where, once again, it is the philosopher’sself-governance that is under discussion.