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1 9 8 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Volume 41 / Issue 2popularized in the twentieth century by the American writer Dale Carnegie,who taught that an other-regarding attitude pays off. Lockean civility combinesthe “no harm” principle of justice with toleration and considerateness.Our “pleasure cannot be had unless [our] benevolence is heartfelt”; at thesame time, the moral law does aim at pleasure (218). Locke endorses “whatcould almost be described as an extension of the self to share in the pleasureof others” (219). Although Forde does not say so, this expansion of pleasureto some degree links the individual to the original god-ordained conditionof commonly held rights, including property rights. Forde emphasizes thatLocke understands happiness differently than Aristotle does. In Aristotle,happiness means the full exercise of virtue; “Aristotle famously identifiedbeauty or nobility as the heart of morality, as well as the motive for moralaction, but this is not, and cannot be, Locke’s view,” which stays within thebounds of pleasure and pain, reward and punishment (220). What is more,Aristotle grounds his claims about happiness on his “analysis of humannature,” which has a hierarchy; “although Locke’s virtue is also based upon arational screening of the appetites, and is also designed to lead to happiness,Locke makes no equivalent arguments to bolster his claim” (220). His “epistemologicalfoundations make…an [Aristotelian] appeal to human natureimpossible”; appetites are better or worse “only in comparison to a rule”—a“mixed mode”—“imposed from without” (221). This mixed mode, ordainedby “god,” rests first of all upon the equality of human beings as human; butagain, “human” cannot mean a species in the Aristotelian sense because nosuch thing can be apprehended noetically, according to Locke’s understandingof human understanding.Forde concludes with an engaging discussion of the relationship betweenLocke’s thought and that of Benjamin Franklin, “Locke’s great Americandisciple” (222). He shows how Franklin adapted Locke’s teachings—mostparticularly his educational teachings—to American conditions. WhereasLocke’s education centers on the task of inculcating civility in the younggentleman—scion of the English/European gentry class—Franklin writesin a much more egalitarian social and political regime, one in which mostchildren will be educated in public schools. “It is Franklin who systematicallyundertakes to educate the poor to industry” (226–27); Franklin also takes asomewhat more lax view of moral self-discipline, and he writes as if moreskeptical that human beings can be brought to unselfish charitableness, nomatter how carefully habituated they may be. But in his esteem for civilityand for works of public service, Franklin joins hands with the philosopher.“Liberalism, as these two authors see it, does not confine itself to a narrow