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Book Review: Locke, Science, and Politics1 9 5extensive than scripture appears to suggest: a general command not only togenerate more human beings but to improve the arts and sciences and “conveniencesof life.” “This god might be dubbed ‘nature’s god,’ and Locke makesclear, even in the First Treatise”—his critique of Robert Filmer’s divine-rightbaseddefense of monarchism—“that he is not relying exclusively, or evenprimarily, on Scripture to discern his intent.” Locke calls reason “the voiceof God in” man; Forde remarks that “this is true, Locke pointedly informsus, whether God ever literally spoke to anyone on this subject or not”—revelation,“in this matter at least,” being “redundant, perhaps even subject tocorrection by reason” (146). Forde also observes that “the chapter on familyin the Second Treatise relies more prominently upon God as legislator thandoes most of the rest of the work,” that the conventional and limited characterof the larger civil society leads him to allow “the figure of the divine legislatorto recede into the background” (145). It might be added that this move servesat least two functions: first, it keeps “god”—even the god discerned primarilyby reason not revelation—at some remove from politics, where claims aboutdivinity can work against the preservation of mankind by fomenting wars ofreligion and persecution in God’s name; second, it addresses the problem ofthe mighty Leviathan, the modern state, empowered to wage war and enforcelaws in accordance with the systematic laws of modern science, including thetechnologies invented under the auspices of that science, but which, by thatvery power, may threaten the very lives and liberties it is intended (by Hobbesmost especially) to preserve. In the Lockean state, religious men will tolerateone another and all will be ruled by consent, understood as rational assent.Similarly, the natural law prohibits spoilage—wasting the natural goodsprovided to all—and requires charity. Locke’s account of property in chapter5 of the Second Treatise serves as the locus for those who regard Locke as themost influential philosopher of modern individualism, and Forde agrees thatindividual rights come to the forefront there. We may accumulate propertywithout limit and have a duty merely to refrain from plundering the possessionsof others; we need offer no charity to the needy. This contradicts theteaching of the First Treatise, however, which not only enjoins us to exercisecharity but gives the needy title to the excess property of others, withouteven the duty to repay their benefactors at some later time (149–50). The contradictiondisappears, however, when one notices that the right to propertyderives from the right of men to self-preservation; Locke employs the pluralform because natural goods originally belong to mankind in common.Private property comes later. “A purely individualist theory would not likelybegin this way” (151), inasmuch as the individual property right “is not an