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8 6 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Volume 41 / Issue 2After all, Callicles is hardly capable of putting any semblance of order in theanarchy of his desires (nor is he interested in that); he insists that moderationis, in fact, a moral quality appropriate for “stupid” people (491e). Callicleshas failed to wage the most noble and courageous battle of all—that whichconsists in resisting one’s acquisitiveness. 77Callicles is thus essentially drunk, intoxicated by his desires for riches 78and power. Quite significantly for my purposes here, Callicles embodiesprecisely what characterizes bad parrhesia (and democracy) according toPlato: drunkenness and intemperance. In the Laws (within the context of adiscussion that seeks to legitimate the usage of symposiums in the learningof sōphrosunē), the Athenian stranger acknowledges the challenge posed byalcohol for self-control. Under the influence of wine, each speaks withoutrestraint and entertains illusions of grandeur: “Everyone is taken out of himselfand has a splendid time; the exuberance of his conversation is matchedonly by his reluctance to listen to his companions, and he thinks himself entitledto run their lives as well as his own” (671b; my italics). As many have noted,this description of the drunk soul is remarkably similar to that of the democraticsoul offered in the Republic (557b). 79 The close links between the drunk(immoderate) soul and bad (immoderate) parrhesia highlight the key role tobe played by sōphrosunē for achieving good parrhesia (the Athenian strangerwill indeed welcome it into the good city). For philosophy to be somethingother than empty chatter or tyrannical domination of others, the individualsthat participate in it must be moderate. To put it somewhat bluntly: nosōphrosunē, no parrhesia.The political importance of the moderate soul is fairly evident: the tyrannicalsoul (emblematic of immoderation) will be the one that has the mostcatastrophic impact on the city. As such, it seems problematic for Foucault toinsist that Socratic parrhesia in the Gorgias is completely dissociated from the77See Gorgias 526d. For a rich analysis of greed (in Plato and in ancient philosophers more generally),see Ryan Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).78Even though Callicles is clearly a wealthy man, it is revealing that he is keen on telling Socratesthat one of the benefits of rhetoric is to allow an individual to keep his riches. For some informationon the life of Callicles (largely an object of speculation) see Debra Nails, The People of Plato (Indianapolis:Hackett, 2002), 75–76; or the excellent introduction to the Gorgias provided by MoniqueCanto-Sperber (Paris: Flammarion, 2010).79Pradeau, Platon, les démocrates et la démocratie, esp. chap. 3. See also Marie-Pierre Noël, “Vin,ivresse et démocratie chez Platon,” in Vin et santé en Grèce ancienne, ed. J. Jouanna and L. Villard(Athens: École française d’Athènes, 2002).