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The Unbridled Tongue: Plato, Parrhesia, and Philosophy6 9frankness. The second criterion (which is of a piece with the first) is truth:what the individual utters must really be what she holds to be the truth. Thespeaker must be convinced not only that her words are a faithful descriptionof this truth; she must also be willing to commit herself fully to this truth.“Le parrèsiaste donne son opinion, il dit ce qu’il pense, il signe en quelquesorte lui-même la vérité qu’il énonce, il se lie à cette vérité, et il s’oblige, parconséquent, à elle et par elle.” 13 (We will come back below to what is understoodhere by “truth.”)Before discussing more closely the injunctions of sincerity and truth, letus mention the other main characteristics of parrhesia. 14 The speaker musttake a risk—the risk of offending the other, the risk of being humiliated by anaudience that refuses to listen, even the risk of being killed (the example ofSocrates killed by Athens is obviously present in Foucault’s mind). No risk,no parrhesia, affirms Foucault. 15 Finally, since parrhesia requires risk taking,the truth teller must necessarily have remarkable courage: indeed, courage isthe moral quality that defines the parrhēsiastēs.Now, what is the goal of all this courageous truth-telling according toFoucault? The intention is to help the other take care of his soul and, perhaps,to convince him to live otherwise—be it Plato speaking to Dion, or Socratestrying to persuade Alcibiades, Glaucon, or Callicles. As Foucault argues,the ideal Platonic philosopher/parrhēsiastēs could be seen as the good doctordescribed by Plato in the Laws (720c–e)—a doctor who is not contentwith prescription, but rather intends to offer at once diagnosis, persuasion/dialogue, and a cure. 16 And indeed, it seems to be one of Foucault’s intentions—throughthis “return to Plato” 17 —to dethrone the modern psychiatrist(or the Christian confessor) and to put, in his place, the parrhēsiastēs, theonly one truly capable of caring for souls.But let us return to the first trait of Socratic parrhesia (the other two traitswill be discussed in the following sections): its brutal and total sincerity, itsdisregard for the claims of civility and conventions. For Saxonhouse, it is herethat we have one of the strengths of Socratic philosophy: its indifference to13Foucault, Le courage de la vérité, 12; my italics.14These two criteria will be discussed in the third part of this essay.15Le gouvernement de soi, 56; Le courage de la vérité, 12, 24.16Le gouvernement de soi, 212–24.17Séverine Mathelin, “Michel Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres,” Essaim, no. 21 (2008):183–85.