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2 1 4 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Volume 41 / Issue 3according to which the city is made happy as a whole by making each citizenas good as possible at his particular job. Whether that results in the happinessof individual citizens is another question. That the citizens must benefitone another does not prove that they make each other happy. More evidencewould have to be provided that the citizens receive the goods necessary forhappiness; but the text does not provide such evidence, at least not explicitly.Nonetheless, the passage does not rule out reductionism.Hence, the ambiguities of the first two passages persist in the third andlast one. There is some possible suggestion that the happiness of the wholeconsists of the happiness of the parts, but there is also language suggestingthat the happiness of the whole can be provided for without having to attendto the happiness of the parts. We lack both explicit definitions of the happinessof the city and of the happiness of the private individual, and thus welack the kind of plausible link between the two that would be necessary tosupport a reductionist reading in the face of the statements that lend themselvesto holism. To the extent that private happiness is allowed in Kallipolis,it is only insofar as such happiness is compatible with civic duty. We cannotknow whether such civically conditioned happiness is greatest until we knowmore about the human good. The text, on its face, is ambiguous to the end,though it leans on the whole in the direction of holism.V.Throughout the analysis so far, we have seen that the reductionist positionsof Kamtekar and Vlastos are not borne out by the text. There are, however,two other variants of reductionism or semireductionism. Perhaps the mostsubstantive defense of the reductionist position is that of C. D. C. Reeve inhis book Philosopher-Kings. On a number of occasions Reeve says both thateveryone is happy in Kallipolis and that nobody can be happy outside of it,including philosophers. 25 Thus, the happiness of the city just is that of itscitizens. The key to this position is his claim that each of the three classes inKallipolis is populated by persons of a distinct psychological type: the philosopherkings are wisdom lovers; the auxiliaries are honor lovers, and the25“Everyone is better off in the Kallipolis than out of it” (Philosopher-Kings, 37); “Kallipolis—thepolis in which everyone is as happy as possible” (95); “it is only in the Kallipolis that private happinessis possible” (155); “the philosopher is happier ruling in the Kallipolis…than being a private citizenunder someone else’s rule” (157–58). Reeve appears to share Kamtekar’s (“Social Justice,” 208) understandingof happiness, which he defines as “the stable optimal satisfaction of real interests throughoutlife” (Philosopher-Kings, 36).