1G0xxeB

Strauss’s Machiavelli and Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor1 5 7subversive spirit of the Gospel. And thus, whereas a reconciliation betweenMachiavelli and a de-Christianized Catholicism is perfectly imaginable, ifcircumstances impose it, a reconciliation between Machiavelli and Christ issimply impossible. The transformation of the modern project into the projectof the Grand Inquisitor is justified, according to Dostoyevsky, by the crisis ofmodernity, whose interpretation once again brings Dostoyevsky and Straussvery close to each other.The common theological premise behind Machiavellian philosophy andthe philosophy of the Grand Inquisitor is the rejection of Christian providenceand eschatology, and the consequence of this premise is the abandonment ofman’s transcendent destiny in favor of a secular project, the goal of which isearthly happiness that brings with it spiritual and moral degradation. Thenew, lowered goal of social action is constructed in accordance with whatboth Machiavelli and the Inquisitor define as the inherent limits of humannature, or at least of the overwhelming majority of human beings. One cannotexpect from them inner change resulting from the cultivation of virtue,but one must first “feed” them “and then ask virtue of them.” Moreover, onecannot rely on the free devotion of their hearts; one must enslave their mindsthrough the power of religious manipulation and, furthermore, be ready tocoerce them when they no longer obey. Imitating thus the power of the lionand the cunning of the fox, the Grand Inquisitor replaces indeed the imitationof the God-man with the imitation of the beast-man, which is anotherway of saying that, as he himself admits, he replaces the imitation of Christwith the imitation of the devil. As far as religious manipulation is concerned,we know, as Strauss emphasized, that “Machiavelli has no moral or otherobjections to pious fraud.”If one prefers to see in Machiavelli not a proponent of atheistic hedonism,but a restorer of pagan virtue, then one would be forced to argue that religiousmanipulation can produce different anthropological types. Thus, whereas the“pious fraud” of the inventors of the Roman religion generated republicanand military virtue, the “pious fraud” of the Grand Inquisitor generatescowardice, hedonistic practices (albeit with the permission of the omnipresentsupervising authorities), and cultural infantilism. One is tempted in thiscase to assimilate the differences between the man produced by Machiavelli’sreligion and the man produced by the religion of the Grand Inquisitor to thecontemporary differences between the neoconservative Right and the liberalLeft. However, if one accepts Strauss’s view of Machiavelli as the first representativeof the Enlightenment, then it would be reasonable to believe that,