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1 9 4 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Volume 41 / Issue 2only find in the moral law; “the priority of law to right separates Locke’s philosophyfrom that of Hobbes” (127). At the same time, although Locke holdsup happiness as the human summum bonum, he is no Aristotelian becauseAristotelians vainly sought the purpose of human life in human nature ratherthan on “its true ground, which stems from mixed modes not devised bynature” but by “divine intelligence” quite “outside of material nature” (132).This teaching also distinguishes Locke from Immanuel Kant, who likewiserejected nature as a moral standard but at the same time rejected happinessas the moral purpose of human life (133). Kant retains the moral law whilerejecting eudaimonism, replacing it (and Locke’s “god”) with the categoricalimperative, a sort of rule of pure reason.Forde’s third chapter elaborates on Locke’s understanding of moral lawand spells out some of its social and political implications. Far from commendingany narrow self-regard, Locke insists on the importance of “civility,”a virtue praised by a Catholic writer he esteemed, Pierre Nicole. But althoughfor Nicole civility rests squarely upon Christian charity, for Locke things arenot so simple. He begins with his version of natural law, “the only comprehensiveexplication” of which he places in chapter 2 of the Second Treatise.The natural law, divine in origin, prescribes not “only my own preservation”(as in Hobbes) but “preservation of all mankind.” This law enjoins me “notto harm others” or even myself, and thus serves “the human common good”while reflecting the bedrock “equality” of human beings, no one of whichmay be sacrificed for the pleasure of another, and who may only be harmed ifhe threatens to harm me or other persons (139). This makes self-preservationfirst of all a duty prescribed by law; the right derives from the duty, and theduty derives “from the common good of mankind rather than the primacyof the individual per se” (140). This principle—the duty to preserve humanityitself—is “the key to understanding much” in Locke’s thought (141). Lockegoes so far as to insist that each individual may “punish violations of thenatural law on behalf of mankind, whether he is directly affected by the violationor not” (143).What Forde calls the “communal” character of Lockean natural lawmanifests itself also in his treatment of the family. The “mutual and reciprocalobligations” of parents and children come not from any social contract“but directly from the law of nature” (144). Children, for the most part lackingin reason, lack the full moral status of persons; they have no rights thatdo not derive from parental duty. Forde acutely observes that Locke takes theGenesis command “be fruitful and multiply” to mean something rather more