Literatur zu Kants Ethik - Ethikseite

2011 [350] Greenberg, Robert (2011): On a Presumed Omission in Kant's Derivation of the Categorical
Imperative, Kantian Review 28, S. 449–59. 42
2005 [351] Greenberg, Sean (2005): From Canon to Dialectic to Antinomy: Giving Inclinations Their
Due, Inquiry 48, S. 232–48. 43
1960 [352] Gregor, Mary J. (1960): Kant’s Conception of a “Metaphysic of Morals”, Philosophical
Quarterly 10, S. 238–251.
1963 [353] Gregor, Mary (1963): Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the
Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Oxford.
1990 [354] Gregor, Mary (1990): Kants System der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten, in Immanuel
Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre. Metaphysik der Sitten, zweiter
Teil, neu herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Bernd Ludwig, Hamburg, S. XXIX–
LXV.
1993 [355] Gregor, Mary (1993): Kant on Obligation, Rights, and Virtue, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 1,
S. 69–102.
2003 [356] Greimann, Dirk (2003): Kants Ableitung der Formel des kategorischen Imperativs aus seinem
bloßen Begriff, in Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse, hrsg. von Uwe
Meixner und Albert Newen, Band 6: Geschichte der Ethik, Paderborn, S. 97–111.
2004 [357] Greimann, Dirk (2004): Ist Kants Ethik ontologisch unschuldig?, Kant-Studien 95, S. 107–27.
2001 [358] Grenberg, Jeanine M. (2001): Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant’s Theory of Action, Kant-
Studien 92, S. 153–79.
2005 [359] Grenberg, Jeanine M. (2005): Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence,
Corruption and Virtue, Cambridge. 44
as primarily involving a willingness to govern one’s conduct by a procedure of impartial co-legislation.
Only the third of these interpretations, I conclude, offers a reasonable and coherent approach to moral
judgment about the limits of commodification.”
42 “A new book by Stephen Engstrom repeats a criticism of Bruce Aune’s of Kant’s derivation of the
universalizability formula of the categorical imperative. The criticism is that Kant omitted at least one
substantive premise in the derivation of the formula: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it become a universal law.’ The grounds for the formula that are given in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, however, are said to support only a weaker requirement, namely,
that a maxim conform to a universal law. Hence, Kant omits at least one necessary substantive premise of
the derivation. This paper attempts to show that nothing substantive is omitted from the argument. It only
needs two principles of inference that it is assumed add nothing substantive to the premises.”
43 “In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical
reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an
antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is a natural dialectic with respect
to morality (4:405), a different claim from those advanced in the first and second Critiques. Förster's
challenge may therefore be reformulated as the problem of explaining why practical reason has a canon in
the first Critique, a dialectic in the Groundwork, and an antinomy in the second Critique. In this paper, I
answer this challenge. I argue that these differences are due to the different aims and scope of the works,
and in particular, the different place of the inclinations in their arguments.”