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JUDGMENT/ORDER IN - WRIT - C No. 37443 of 2011 at Allahabad Dated-21.10....http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.doPage 105 of 19710/21/2011which were filed within the reasonable time and there is no delay in such writ petitions at all. For example WritPetition No.62649/2008, Savitri Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors, same notifications dated 12/3/2008 and 30/6/2008are under challenge. Similarly, with regard to Village Pali, Writ Petition No.25464/2008, Ghyanendra Singh Vs.State of U.P. & Ors, there is no delay. There are writ petitions of Village Aimnabad i.e. Writ Petition 26162/2008,Shripal Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors, 26159/2008, Lakhi Ram Vs. State of U.P. & Ors, and writ petition ofVillage Khanpur being 20227/2009, Parag & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., which cannot be said to have beenfiled with laches.We have referred to Writ Petition No.5670/2007, Keshari Singh & Anr Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., of VillageYakubpur, in which declaration under Section 6 was issued on 06/1/2007 and the writ petition was filed in theMonth of January, 2007 itself.The issue to be answered is as to whether the writ petitions filed with delay in the facts of the present case be notentertained and be thrown out or the Court may consider to examine their grievance on merits inspite of thepetitioners having approached this Court with delay. Learned counsel for the parties have referred to variousjudgment of the Apex Court and this Court in support of their submissions. It is necessary to refer to the principleslaid down by the Apex Court in context of entertainment of the writ petitions which have been filed with delay.The first judgment which needs to be considered is the judgement of the Apex Court in Moon Mills Ltd Vs. R.Meher, A.I.R 1967 SC 1450, in which the Apex Court has reiterated the principle as has been laid down by SirBarnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abraham Farewell, and JohnKemp, (1874) 5 P.C. 221. Following was laid down in para 36 which is quoted below:"36. In the circumstances of this case, we do not consider that there is such acquiescence on the part of theappellant as to disentitle it to a grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the issue of a writ ofcertiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. It is also true that the writ will not be granted if there is suchnegligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse oftime and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent, though notidentical with, similar to the exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been clearly statedby Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp,(1874) 5 PC 221 at p. 239, as follows:-"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would bepractically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly beregarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waivingthat remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedywere afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in everycase, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay ofcourse not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried uponprinciples substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delayand the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justiceor injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as related to the remedy.""In the present case, we are of opinion that there is no such negligence or laches or acquiescence on the part ofthe appellant as may disentitle it to the grant of a writ."Another judgment which needs to be considered is (1974) 1 SCC 317, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar & Ors Vs.The State of Maharashtra & Ors (Constitution Bench). Following was laid down in paragraph 10:-"10. It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner onground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reasons of the delay in filing thepetition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. This principlewas stated in the following terms by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Tilokchand v. H. B. Munshi (supra):"The party claiming Fundamental Rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The actionof courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person movingthe Court."Sikri, J., (as he then was), also restated the same principle in equally felicitous language when he said in R. N.Bose v. Union of India: "It Would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them.