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JUDGMENT/ORDER IN - WRIT - C No. 37443 of 2011 at Allahabad Dated-21.10....http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.doPage 108 of 19710/21/2011thus, well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in theacquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Courthas, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmaticconsideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised itspower to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the powerunder Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference.The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learnedsingle Judge dismissing the writ petition or the ground of latches."The next judgment which needs to be considered is of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of GreaterBombay Vs. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd.& Ors, (1996) 11 SCC 501.In the aforesaid case the appellant has approached the High Court after 4 years of passing of the award andpossession was taken. The Apex court laid down that although the High Court has, no doubt, discretionarypowers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification issued under Section 4(1) and declarationunder Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When theaward was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award.Following was laid down in paragraph 29 which is quoted below:-"29. It is thus well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps takenin the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The HighCourt has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification underSection 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmaticconsideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised itspower to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the powerunder Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference.The Division Bench of High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned singleJudge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches."Another judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents is Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs.State of Rajasthan & Ors, AIR 2008 SC 1494. The Apex Court in the said case referring to its earlier judgment asnoticed above laid down following in paragraph 17 which is quoted below:-"17. In the present case also, the writ petition having been filed after taking over the possession and the awardhaving become final, the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, theorder of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench are affirmed to the extent of dismissal of the writpetition and the special appeal without going into the merits thereof. This appeal also deserves to be dismissedwithout going into the merits of the case and is dismissed as such. No costs."The Apex Court again had an occasion to consider the question of delay and laches in Sawaran Lata & Ors. Vs.State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 532. Considering the earlier judgments the Apex court laid down following inparagraph 11 which is quoted below:"11. Reference in this case may be made to the decision of the National Commission rendered in United IndiaInsurance Co. Ltd. v. Gian Singh. In the decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission(NCDRC) it has been held that in a case of violation of condition of the policy as to the nature of use of thevehicle, the claim ought to be settled on a non-standard basis. The said decision of the National Commission hasbeen referred to by this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nitin Khandelwal."Another judgment of the Apex Court relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents is SulochanaChandrakant Galande Vs. Pune Municipal Transport & Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 467.In the aforesaid case, suit land was acquired under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976, in the years1978-1979. A Bus Depot was constructed on the part of the suit land. The appellant preferred revision underSection 34 of the Act,1976 on 06/4/1998, to the State Government on the ground that the land ought not to havebeen acquired under the Act,1976 that on the date of commencement of the Act, 1976 i.e. 17.2.1976, the suit landwas not within the limits of urban area. The revision was allowed on 29/9/1998. The Apex court in the aforesaidcase considered the provision of Section 34 of the 1976 Act, which empowers the State Government on its ownmotion, call for and examine records of any order passed or proceeding taken under the provisions of the Act.The Apex Court held that undoubtedly Section 34 does not prescribe any limitation during which the Revisional
JUDGMENT/ORDER IN - WRIT - C No. 37443 of 2011 at Allahabad Dated-21.10....http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.doPage 109 of 19710/21/2011power can be exercised by the State. However, the Apex Court laid down that the revisional power can beexercised only within a reasonable time. Following was laid down in paragraphs 28 and 29 which are quotedbelow:-"28. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words"at any time" in Section 34 of the Act, 1976. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orderspassed under the Act open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of renderingtitle of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case, it isassumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the title overthe declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Courthas to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose andobject of enactment of the statute.29. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the Revisional powers cannot be usedarbitrarily at belated stage for the reason that the order passed in Revision under Section 34 of the Act, 1976, is ajudicial order. What should be reasonable time, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case."Recent judgment of the Apex Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors, (2011) 5SCC 394 has also been relied by the learned counsel for the respondents. In the aforesaid case, there was adelay of 6 years between the passing the award and filing of the writ petition. Following principles were laid downin paragraphs 16,17,18,19 and 26 which are quoted below:-"16. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf ofthe BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief torespondent No.1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized forimplementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about sixyears between the passing of award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain theprayer made in the writ petition.17.It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but oneof the several rules of self imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will not entertainpetitions filed after long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled/crystallized rights of theparties. If the writ petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar cause,the High Court will treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits.18.In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, the Constitution Bench considered the effect of delay in filing writpetition under Article 226 of the Constitution and held: (AIR pp.1011-12, paras 17 & 21)"17.......It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionarypower. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the severalmatters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made bythe aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it.....It is not easy nor is itdesirable to lay down any Rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if therehas been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedyof mandamus.* * *21.The learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply tothe granting of relief under Art 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature asthe time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be areasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The court mayconsider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for theremedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it isunreasonable."19. In matters involving challenge to the acquisition of land for public purpose, this Court has consistently heldthat delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously and relief denied to the petitioner if he fails to offerplausible explanation for the delay. The Court has also held that the delay of even few years would be fatal to thecause of the petitioner, if the acquired land has been partly or wholly utilised for the public purpose.26. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as
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