ISSUE 76 : May/Jun - 1989 - Australian Defence Force Journal

More documents

Recommendations

Info

46 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 8950. Young, Stephen., in Thompson, op. tit., p225.51. Ibid.52. This advice emanated from the US State Department,people such as Sir Robert Thompson, and internally fromsuch officers as then then Lt Col David Hackworth. SeeHackworth, David., "Guerrilla Battalion, US Style" in Infantry,Jan-Feb 1988 for a description of a US unit whichemployed the enemy's own tactics. Westmoreland's view ofinside criticism is demonstrated by the following commenton Hackworth: ". . . as reflected by these awards (he hadseveral awards from the DSC down) (Hackworth's) combatrecord was unusual, but . . . developed an affinity for personalpublicity . . . spoke irresponsibly . . . conductedhimself with questionable ethics . . . retired prematurely. . .", Westmoreland, op. cit., p305.53. Paraphrased in part from a view put by AmbassadorRobert Komer in Thompson, op. cit., p268-269.BIBLIOGRAPHYGravel, Senator Mike (Ed)., The Pentagon Papers: TheDefense Department History of United States DecisionMaking on Vietnam (Vol III and IV), Beacon Press,Boston, 1971.Griffith, Paddy, Forward into Battle: Fighting Tacticsfrom Waterloo to Vietnam, Antony Bird Pubs, Chichester,1981.Krepinevich, Andrew F, Jnr., The Army and Vietnam,John Hopkins Uni Press, Baltimore, 1986.Palmer, Gen Bruce, The 25 Year War: America's MilitaryRole in Vietnam, Simon & Schuster, 1984.Sarkesian, Sam C, Beyond the Battlefield: the NewMilitary Professionalism, Pergamon Press, NY, 1981.Summers, Harry G., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis ofthe Vietnam War, Presidio Press, Novato, 1982.Thompson, Scott W & Frizzell, Donaldson, D (Eds)., TheLessons of Vietnam, Qld Uni Press, St Lucia, 1977.Turley, William S., The Second Indochina War, West view,Boulder, 1986.Walt, Lewis W., Strange War, Strange Strategy: AGeneral's Report on Vietnam, Award Books, NY, 1970.Westmoreland, William C, A Soldier Reports, DellPublishing Co, NY, 1976.Westmoreland, William C & Sharp, U.S.G., Report on theWar in Vietnam, US Govt Printing Office, WashingtonDC, 1968.GEE HARDWAREThe following items will be supplied as GFE to be incorporatedinto the IASSF. Respondents should indicate anyadditionalitems or quantities of GFE hardware required.a. 4 x CP-1699/AYK-14 Mission Computers;b. 2 x AN/AYQ-9(V) Stores Management Set, comprising:(i) 2 x CP-1342/AYQ-9(V) Stores Management Processor,(ii) 2 x KY-851/AYQ-9(V) Wingtip Decoder,(hi) 4 x KY-853/AYQ-9(V) Wing Pylon Decoder,(iv) 2 x KY-854/AYQ-9(V) Fuselage Decoder,(v) 1 x KY-855/AYQ-9(V) Gun Decoder;c. 2 x 1P-1317-A Digital Display Indicator;d. 1 x IP-1350/A Horizontal Indicator;e. 1 x AN/AVQ-28 Head-Up Display;f. 1 x C-10380/ASQ Up-Front Control Panel;g. 1 x C-10382/A Communications System Controller;h. 1 x AM-6979/A Intercommunication Set;i. 1 x An/APG Radar set, comprising:(i) 1 x CP-1326/APG-65 Radar Target Data Processor,(ii) 1 x MT-4955/APG-65 Electrical Equipment Rack,(hi) 1 x AS-3254/APG-65 Antenna,(iv) 1 x T-1377/APG-65 Radar Transmitter,(v) 1 x R-2089/APG-65 Radar Receiver-Exciter,(vi) 1 x CP-1325/APG-65 Computer Power Supply;7.4.1.15.2 Air-to-Ground TargetsFour types of A/G targets shall be provided:a. Fixed-point targets: These shall consist of up to five fixed,ground-referenced targets.b. Moving-point targets: These shall consist of up to fivemoving ground-referenced targets, moving at up to 100knots. These targets shall not be required to moverelative to each other.c. Line targets: There shall be at least one target which correspondsto a fixed linear ground feature.d. Multipoint targets: There shall be at least one targetwhich corresponds to a four-sided fixed ground area.
From Inchon to San Carlos: Amphibious Warfare since 1945By Colonel John Jackson, ARES(This article is based on a paper, submittedfor the ADFA Master of Defence Studiesprogram.)IntroductionTHE enemy came up ... a few ships at atime, since there was no room to bringgreater numbers inshore, and, while somerested, others kept up the attack . . . in theirefforts to force back the defenders and capturethe fortification. It was Brasidas whodistinguished himself more than anyone. Hewas in command of a warship, and when hesaw that, because of the difficult nature ofthe ground, the captains and helmsmen,even at points where it did seem possible toland, were hanging back for fear of damagingtheir ships, he shouted out . . . askingwhat was the point in sparing ships andmeanwhile tolerating the existence of anenemy fortress . . . telling them to break uptheir ships so long as they forced a landing,. . . to run them aground, to make a landingsome way or other, and to overwhelm theplace and its defenders'.The amphibious assault, involving as it doesa transition from sea to land of all the elementsof force — combat, support and command — isa most complex, risky and yet potentially mosteffective form of attack. To the missiles of theenemy are added the vagaries of the sea, and inno other form of attack is preparation moreessential, both of materiel and of the men involved.Nevertheless, in the amphibious assaultas in all others the critical point is the applicationof superior combat power at the appropriatetime and place.As Thucydides' account implies, the Spartansat Pylos were not prepared: the landing sitecould not accommodate the assault force, clearpriorities were not specified in ordersbeforehand, assault elements were committedpiecemeal or unsupported, and the men werenot imbued by training with the necessity ofgetting ashore rapidly and closing with theenemy. Notwithstanding their justified reputationas the greatest of the Greek armies, theSpartans failed to capture Pylos.This article examines developments in amphibiouswarfare and its place in maritimestrategy since World War 2. The impact of newequipment and techniques on amphibiousoperations will be examined, from the assaulton Inchon during the Korean War to the landingin San Carlos Bay in The Falklands War.In addition, the current capacity of the majormaritime powers to conduct amphibious operationsas an instrument of naval strategy will besurveyed.Amphibious Warfare in Nuclear Strategy1945-1950Amphibious operations may be conductedfor strategic reasons, as, for example, the onlymeans of gaining a foothold on a hostile shore— as in Normandy or Gallipoli or TheFalklands. Or they may be a matter of operationalor tactical choice, to harass or to achievesurprise — as at Dieppe or Inchon 2 . In addition,the potential to mount amphibious operations,on any scale and in a wide range of locations,has recently emerged as a key element inmaritime strategy.Till points out that operations against theshore are one of the two main ways in whichcommand of the sea is exercised. They mayrange from invasion in order to conquer territory,to minor raids and bombardment.Because war is fundamentally about territory,some strategic thinkers cast operations againstthe shore as the culmination of the naval art.These include Brodie, Nimitz and Gorshkov,who wrote: "Successful operations of a fleetagainst the shore brought a better result thanthe operations of fleet against fleet. In the firstcase the fleet solved a direct 'territorial' task,whereas in the second, victory over the enemy'sfleet merely created the prerequisites for thelater solution of territorial tasks'". Others, includingCorbett before World War 2, andOmar Bradley immediately after it, believedthat sea power could not defeat a modern landpower, and for a time their view prevailed.After World War 2, US strategic and nuclearsuperiority saw the adoption of a strategy ofmassive nuclear retaliation to defeat aggression.Dependence on long-range air strike and
Page 2 and 3: Defence Force JournalContributions
Page 4: $00-T-HMAS ADELAIDE FFG NO. 01
Page 8: 6 DEFENCE I ORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May
Page 11 and 12: "ONE-A-PENNY, TWO-A-PENNY . . ." 9a
Page 13 and 14: Medical Support to the Parachute Ba
Page 15 and 16: MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE PARACHUTE BA
Page 17 and 18: MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE PAR AC HI H
Page 19 and 20: MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE PARACHUTE BA
Page 21 and 22: Should Australia Ratify the 1977 Pr
Page 23 and 24: SHOULD AUSTRALIA RATIFY THE 1977 PR
Page 29 and 30: GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMSOne f
Page 31 and 32: The Distress Syndrome("Stress") in
Page 33 and 34: THE DISTRESS SYNDROME 31DIAGRAM(Lar
Page 35 and 36: TH1 DISTRESS SYNDROME-: 338. Failur
Page 37 and 38: THE DISTRESS SYNDROME 35(b) Formula
Page 39 and 40: :HE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAMing
Page 41 and 42: THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 39w
Page 43 and 44: THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 41T
Page 45 and 46: THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 43e
Page 47: THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM 45t
Page 51 and 52: I ROM INCHON IO SAN CARLOS 49retali
Page 53 and 54: FROM INCHON TO SAN CARLOS 51equipme
Page 55 and 56: I ROM INCHON TO SAN CARLOS 53The ma
Page 57 and 58: FROM INCHON TO SAN CARLOS 55b. inst
Page 59 and 60: I ROM INCHON IO S\\ CARLOS31. US am
Page 61 and 62: U.S. DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE LATE
Page 63 and 64: U.S. DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE LATE
Page 65 and 66: L'.S. DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE I AT

ISSUE 76 : May/Jun - 1989 - Australian Defence Force Journal

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?