ISSUE 76 : May/Jun - 1989 - Australian Defence Force Journal

S2 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89allies, through control of ocean access to rawmaterials by naval power.He went on to point out the ability of readyamphibious forces to contribute in a major wayto three of the four areas of maritime strategy:sea control, power projection and presence, ifnot to strategic deterrence. In lower level crises,peacetime forward deployment of amphibiousforces in areas of vital national security interestscould, for example, support diplomaticefforts by visible show of force and demonstrationof interest in areas of threatening crisis, aswell as assist allies and facilitate the commitmentof forces, if required, without actual landbasing.In crises requiring actual intervention whilelimiting the scope of conflict, Wilson pointed tothe capability of deployed amphibious forces tooperate independently with little preparationand minimal support. Similarly, in situations ofdirect or indirect confrontation with a majorpower outside the NATO area, such forcescould contribute readily to deterring, limitingor countering enemy action. Missions in thesescenarios could include assistance to allies,evacuation or protection of US nationals orproperty, interposition between contendingparties, protection of an area or resource, andin the latter scenario, commitment to a combatrole.In all-out conventional war, Wilson defined arole for amphibious forces in support of otheroperations, not only in the reinforcement ofNATO and protection of the European sea linesof communication (SLOC), e.g. by control ofthe Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, but in directsupport of the land campaign, particularly onthe Soviet flanks, e.g. in the Baltic. He stressed,however, not only the maintenance of theUSMC, but its readiness for amphibious operations.This required combined arms training, tointegrate the application of naval, ground andair weapons systems, exercises in varyinggeographic locations, to reflect global responsibilities,and the acquisition of appropriateweapons and equipment 2 '.Others supported the maritime strategydebate, putting cases for the revamping of amphibiouscapability, integrated marine airpower, and the advantages of forward deployment.One of the most telling of these isMellin's argument for the amphibious force asa ready political instrument of national policy.He developed Luttwak's functional typologyfor classifying and analysing the political usesof an amphibious force' 2 , tabulating the relationshipbetween specific amphibious force tacticsand specific diplomatic objectives 23 .By the late 1970s, strategic assessments of thebuild up of Soviet naval power in the KolaPeninsula and the North-west Pacific, andgrowing Soviet influence in Angola, Ethiopia,Vietnam and Kampuchea confirmed the newSoviet interest in maritime strategy. This, andworld events including the Iranian revolution,the Iranian seizure of American hostages andthe Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led to abroader world approach in US strategic thinking.The Carter Doctrine of January 1980recognised US vital interest in Persian Gulf oilsupplies and a return to a global militarystrategy. A revised maritime strategy establishedthe Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), basedon carrier battle groups and amphibious forces,and equipment for a MAB was moved by neartermprepositioning ships to Diego Garcia 24 .Soon afterwards, The Falklands War (1982)brought home the relationship between navalpower and diplomacy and deterrence, and thatbetween sea control and air superiority. It alsosaw two major amphibious operations andnumerous minor ones. The first of these,Operation Rosario, was the Argentine invasionof The Falklands and South Georgia, and includedthe landing of a marine battalion group(2500 men) by an amphibious force comprisinga carrier, six destroyers, two corvettes, a submarine,a landing ship and two trooptransports. Both landings were successful, butresistance on South Georgia was a sufficientreminder of the difficulties of opposedlandings 25 .The British Operation Corporate to retakeThe Falklands was much larger, and militarilyand logistically more difficult. The operationmeant assembling a force of two carriers, twoassault ships, 23 destroyers and frigates, 21Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels and about50 STUFT (including three passenger liners),traversing 8,000 miles, and conducting abrigade-sized opposed amphibious assault,simultaneously with a naval battle for airsuperiority. A preliminary operation to recaptureSouth Gergia, although successful,demonstrated the hazards of amphibious warfarein the South Atlantic.