ISSUE 76 : May/Jun - 1989 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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; 4 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89marines, organised in two divisions and onebrigade, including tanks and 8 LSTs. In South-East Asia, Vietnam has 27,000 naval infantry in10 marine brigades and seven LSTs, and marineforces of between 10,000 and 20,000 are maintainedby Thailand, Indonesia and thePhilippines 30 .The largest specialised amphibious forces todayare those maintained by the US as a majorelement in their maritime strategy. They includetwo main elements:• The USMC has 195,000 personnel. Theoperational elements remain the Fleet MarineForces, organised principally in 3 marinedivisions, each with a marine air wing ofabout 150 combat aircraft, and a supportgroup. Each of these groupings under theMarine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)concept can constitute any of three types asMAGTF according to the size required forthe mission, as before: a MAF, based on acomplete division, a MAB (supportedbrigade) or a MAU (supported battalion). Atpresent there are two MAF based in the USand one in Japan/Okinawa which has a MABin Hawaii. MAUs are deployed either permanentlyor intermittently in the Mediterranean,the Philippines and the Indian Ocean.The USMC Reserve of 43,000 has a furtherdivision and air wing.• The USN Amphibious Forces compriseabout 60 specialised amphibious ships, 56large landing craft and many smaller craft.These are deployed with US fleets that includea marine capability".Combat air support is integral to theMAGTF. The marine air wing provides itsMAF with a range of air support, including tacticalair power, for amphibious assault operationsor sustained operations ashore 32 . Ittypically includes:4 interceptor squadrons of F-4 being replacedby F-18;4 FGA squadrons of AV-8C, AV-8B (Harrier),A-4 or A-6;2 attack helicopter squadrons of UH-1 beingreplaced by AH-1;8 transport helicopter squadrons, either lightUH-1, medium CH-46 or heavy CH-53;1 tanker squadron of KC-130; andreconnaissance, ECM, FAC and commandaircraft.At MAB level a marine air group is formed,with lesser capability, but normally includingfixed-wing attack aircraft. At MAU level offensiveair support is usually provided by V/STOLaircraft.As for logistic support, current US planningfor large amphibious operations recognises thatthe scale has changed for the US Navy, particularlyin shipping resources. The British experiencein The Falklands has emphasised theneed to intergrate civilian-manned and -ownedships into the Amphibious Task Force (ATF),and to plain for and train with civilian shipping'3 . To provide for this, US ATF doctrineseparates the assault echelon (AE) from thefollow-on echelon (AFOE). For a Marine AmphibiousForce (MAF) landing, i.e. a marinedivision fully supported, the AFOE might berequired to transport and land 19,000 troopsand 5,500,000 cubic feet of cargo, excludingPDL' 4 . The estimated requirement for civilianshipping includes:7 troopships1 aviation support ship1 crane ship4 LASH9 container ships4 roll-on/roll-off ships4 tankersApart from ships of Military Sealift Command(MSC), capable of operating and communicatingwith a naval force, civilian shipstaken up from trade (STUFT) present significantplanning problems for future amphibiousoperations. In a war situation the best shiptypes may not be available. Older break-bulkcargo ships may substitute for container ships,and the ATF commander may need to secure aport for unloading. The US is short of troopships.As The Falklands war showed, thoseavailable can increase their troop capacity fourfold,but without helicopter or landing craftdisembarking capability, alternatives might berequired, such as securing an airhead. Otherdifficulties with STUFT include:a. lower damage tolerance,b. low or nil cargo transfer capability at sea,c. no cargo handling personnel,d. no medical facilities, ande. no organic defences.Some solutions are being investigated likecontainerised berthing. The Falklands War suggestsothers, including:a. troopships deployment of landing force airdefence units,
FROM INCHON TO SAN CARLOS 55b. installation of "quick-fix" nelo-decks, andc. use of organic marine medical resources.Amphibious Warfare in ContemporaryMaritime StrategyUS military strategy developed since 1980sees Europe, the Pacific and South-west Asia asvital interests. It includes the concepts of deterrence,forward deployment and cooperationwith allies. It emphasises control of vital sealines of communication (SLOC) through navalsuperiority, and the capacity to react to a widerange of crises. The US maritime strategy providesa planning base for the employment ofnaval forces in low-intensity conflict and inglobal conventional war with the Soviet Union.The aim is to deter war if at all possible; then, ifdeterrence fails, to destroy enemy maritimeforces; protect allied SLOCs; support the landcampaign; and secure favourable leverage forwar termination 35 .Under the maritime strategy, the AmphibiousWarfare Strategy was approved forpublicatin in 1985 36 .It outlines the phased employment of amphibiousforces in global conventional conflict,but recognises their utility in the more likelycrisis scenarios of low-intensity conflict, alongthe lines suggested by Liddell Hart:"Since Russia has developed nuclear weaponsin quantity to match America's, a nuclearstalemate has developed. In such a situation,local and limited aggression becomes more likely,and amphibious forces become morenecessary, both as deterrent and as a counter toaggression — a counter which can be usedwithout being suicidal and a deterrent which istherefore credible." 37The concept of "force-in-readiness" stressesthe value of amphibious forces in rapid and effectivecrisis suppression and preventing minorconflicts becoming major ones. It includes:• The forward peacetime deployment of amphibiousready groups (ARG) with theirMAGTFs based on a MAU, in the Mediterraneanand Pacific/Indian Oceans;• The deployment of three squadrons ofmaritime prepositioning ships (MPS), eachwith equipment and supplies for a MAB for30 days, in the Atlantic, Indian and PacificOceans; and• The training of deployed MAUs innaval/amphibious special operations.Phase 1 of the Amphibious Warfare Strategyis Deterrence, or the Transition to War, whenUS naval forces would deploy as far forward aspossible in response to a growing crisis betweenthe superpowers. Marine action in this phaseincludes:• deployment of a MAB in each of the Atlanticand Pacific;• relocation of MPS squadrons to join airliftedMABs; and• amphibious deployment of a MAB toNorway 38 .Phase 2 is Seize the Initiative — the counterattack following a Soviet invasion of CentralEurope, when Soviet naval forces will be engagedin all theatres, in particular to keep pressureon the Soviet flanks in Northern Europe, theMediterranean and the Pacific, and to preventthe movement of forces to Central Europe orSoviet interdiction of NATO's reinforcingSLOCs. Likely amphibious missions in thisphase would include:• MAB or MAF amphibious assaults to secureadvanced naval bases for the introduction ofground forces;• amphibious assaults along the Norwegiancoast, and, as opportunity presents, in theNorth and Baltic Seas, the Mediterranean andNorth-west Pacific; and• retention of an amphibious reserve to exploitSoviet vulnerabilities, or for the emergencyreinforcement of NATO defence on theEnglish Channel.Phase 3 is the NATO counter offensive onEastern Europe and Russia, including naval offensivesagainst the Kola Peninsula and in theNorth-west Pacific. MAGTFs supported bybattleship surface action groups would be taskedto retake lost territory or seize key objectivesin the Soviet rear, on the North Cape, theEastern Baltic or Black sea coasts, the Kurilesor Sakhalin Island.In support of the amphibious warfarestrategy, equipment programs include completionof the LSD-41 and LHD-1 classes of amphibiousassault ships, to increase the total ofamphibious ships to 76 by 1995. This will providean assault lift capacity for both a MAF anda MAB. In addition, acquisition in quantity ofLCAC and the MV-22A Osprey tilt-rotor aircraftwill improve ship-to-shore movementcapacity from over the horizon.
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Defence Force JournalContributions
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$00-T-HMAS ADELAIDE FFG NO. 01
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Page 11 and 12: "ONE-A-PENNY, TWO-A-PENNY . . ." 9a
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Page 21 and 22: Should Australia Ratify the 1977 Pr
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Page 29 and 30: GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMSOne f
Page 31 and 32: The Distress Syndrome("Stress") in
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ISSUE 76 : May/Jun - 1989 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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