ISSUE 76 : May/Jun - 1989 - Australian Defence Force Journal

60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 76 May/June 89been primarily defensive in nature. With theadvent of the Carter administration, and specificallywith Carter's Presidential Directive 59(Pd-59), US deterrence policy became essentiallyoffense-oriented. The Reagan administrationcontinued, and enlarged upon, this offensivedirection. US strategic doctrine in the post-World War Two era, then, has been based onvarious conceptions of deterrence, but deterrencenonetheless; this was to continue into the1980s. With a basis in the late 1970s, within aframework of deterrence, US strategic doctrinewas to shift from an emphasis on retaliatory,second strike capability, MAD, to conceptsbased on limited nuclear war, warfighting strategies,and emphasis on first strike, offensivecapabilities.Whatever their ideological differences, theReagan administration's offensive strategic doctrineis in many ways a continuation of thatarticulated in the latter stages of the Carteradministration. Both reflected dissatisfactionwith MAD, yet both emphasised the importanceof deterrence as the context within which anyreplacement of MAD should be placed. Carter'sPresidential Directive 59 proved to be the basisupon which US strategic doctrine developed inthe 1980s. In many respects, this doctrine wasa refinement of Carter's countervailing strategy.PD-59, signed by President Carter in July,1980, called for 'the capacity for flexible, controlledretaliation against a full range of targetsfor any attack at any level.' 14 Such 'countervailing'strategy, wrote President Carter'sNational Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski,. . . marked an important new step in theevolution of American strategic though . . .flexibility was expanded beyond preplannedoptions. Greater targetting emphasis wasplaced on military targets, on CI,. . . itcalled for a 'look-shoot-look' capability foridentifying new and moving targets. 15PD-59 was concerned with 'flexible use ofour forces, strategic and general purpose, onbehalf of war aims that we would select as weengaged in conflict." 6 The essence of PD-59was such flexibility. Harold Brown, Carter'sDefense Secretary, has stated that the US mustbe able to attack 'a wide range of targets,' andthat credibility 'cannot be maintained. . .with. . . inflexible forces. . .' I7This doctrine represents a warfighting conceptionof an adequate deterrent. Indeed, withits emphasis on limited nuclear options andresponses, Brzezinski has referred to the 'modernisationof American military doctrine, from1978 to 1980' as moving the US 'towards a warfightingdoctrine.' 18 PD-59 represents a search,begun during the Nixon administration, for astrategic doctrine other than one which offeredonly two options: suicide or surrender. PD-59deemphasises retaliatory capabilities and insteadconcentrates on military targets and 'lookshoot-look'capabilities.Carter's counterveiling strategy, therefore,emphasises nuclear warfighting capabilities. Beyondthe traditional military bias in favour ofthe offense, however, there are also politicalreasons for such emphasis.' 9 From the outset ithas been argued that credibility, the perceptionthat one side has of the other's willingness touse their nuclear weapons, are as important todeterrence as actual capabilities. 'Power lay inthe perception.' 2 " And, as Brzezinski argues,I was convinced that our old doctrine waspolitically and psychologically credible onlyas long as America was in fact superior, andthat it might not deter an opponent capableof conducting both a major or a more limitednuclear conflict. . . Defense planning. . . hadto accommodate itself to this new reality,and our defense doctrine and programsshould be adjusted accordingly. 21In effect, PD-59 was as much a signal to theSoviet Union as it was a blueprint for fightingnuclear war.So, PD-59 was a response aimed at makingthe US deterrent posture more credible, as wellas a response to improved nuclear capabilitieswhich allowed, through improved C'l (command,control, communications and intelligence)facilities and greater missile accuracy,the US to adopt such a policy. Brzezinski hadbecome concerned that the- existing (prior to1979/1980) deterrence doctrine, 'based on theprinciple of mutually assured destruction, hadbeen formulated largely in a setting of actualUS superiority in the early sixties. . .' He hassubsequently written that PD-59, in replacingMAD, was 'a more coherent and more effectivedoctrine of deterrence, designed in keepingwith. . . the capabilities. . . of our potentialopponent and thus more likely to deter himeffectively.'" Similarly, Harold Brown believedthat MAD had been disavowed, not deterrence,when he stated that credibility cannot be maintainedwith 'a purely retaliatory counter-urbanindustrial strategy,' and, after leaving office,