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Fighter Combat

Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering

Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering

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264 SECTION TACTICS, TWOVERSUS-TWOof these factors may more easily be overshadowed by the more obscureparameters of fighter design, and by chance, in the multi-bogey environment.<strong>Fighter</strong>s, weapons systems, and tactics must be designed to reducecrew task loading. The vast majority of fighter pilots lost have beenunaware of their attacker until it was too late. Reducing crew task loading,designing fighters for improved aircrew field of view and minimum detectability,and employing tactical doctrines that incorporate mutual supportmust, therefore, be of prime concern.Four tactical doctrines have been examined so far: fighting wing, doubleattack, loose deuce, and one-versus-one engagement techniques. Fightingwing has been shown to be generally ineffective in the two-versus-twoenvironment except against opponents with inferior pilot training, aircraft,or weapons. Engaging the bogey pair in two separate one-versus-onefights can be effective, provided the fighters have a weapons, pilot proficiency,or performance superiority. The lack of mutual support providedby this approach, however, may reduce offensive efficiency and leave thefighters vulnerable to coordinated bogey attacks as well as to attacks byadditional wild-card enemy fighters.Double attack and loose deuce doctrines employ essentially identicalinitial attacks (i.e., brackets and drags) in an attempt to eliminate one orboth bogeys. If necessary, a single remaining opponent can be engaged withgreater safety and effectiveness than an enemy pair can be engaged. (Thecomparative attributes of these two doctrines in two-versus-one situationswere covered in the preceding chapter.)The decision to re-engage or disengage is particularly critical if bothopponents survive an initial attack, since prolonged two-versus-two maneuveringis a difficult and chancy undertaking. This decision can usuallybe made by the flight leader before the fighters ever take off; the decision isbased on such considerations as mission objective, likely opponents, comparativepilot experience, relative aircraft and weapons-system design, andenvironmental conditions. Disengagements are most effective with minimumhesitation.Once the fighters are committed to two-versus-two, double attack doctrinecalls for the fighter with the greatest offensive potential to engage themore vulnerable adversary one-on-one (offensive), or to engage the greatestthreat (defensive), while the free fighter protects the engaged fighter fromattacks by the free bogey or by wild cards. If either fighter becomes defensive,the other comes immediately to its aid in any way possible. Thismethod can be quite effective, particularly when the friendly fighters havesuperiority in pilot proficiency, performance, or weapons. Double attackcan become easily saturated by additional bogeys (more than two), however,and mutual support between fighters can be effectively destroyed bydetermined attacks against the free fighter. In such situations the fighttends to divide into two separate engagements, often with undesirableresults. The free fighter (and therefore the entire tactical doctrine) isespecially vulnerable to hostile all-aspect missiles.Loose deuce doctrine during prolonged two-versus-two engagementsdictates that each fighter pilot operate semi-autonomously, alternately

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