Paradox

THE MEGARIAN IDENTITY CRISIS 81A = B, then one must grasp A and grasp B. But then one willknow that A and B are one and the same!Plato never formulates the paradox of analysis in hisdialogues. However, there was a commentator on Plato’sTheaetetus between 50 B.C. and 150 B.C. who displays arudimentary awareness of the paradox. In the course ofexplaining a mistaken criticism of a definition, the commentatorsaysThis is a misunderstanding, they say: for the object andthe definition are convertible, but the definition does notmean exactly the same as the name. For if one personasked “What is a man?” and the other replied “A rationalmortal animal,” just because a rational mortal animal isa man we won’t say that when asked “What is a man?”he replied a “A man.”(Quoted by Sedley 1993, 136)The commentator is trying to prevent the principle of thesubstitutivity of identicals from undermining the informativenessof “Man is a rational mortal animal.” The principleposes the same threat to the informativeness of “Euclides isthe veiled figure.” The paradox of analysis is the paradox ofthe veiled figure as applied to definitional identifications.When the definer says female fox is the meaning of vixen, heis identifying figures in a dark conceptual landscape. Weknow these identifications are helpful, but we face an unexpectedlygood argument for the counteranswer that theseidentity statements are useless.I have doubts about whether Euclides himself wouldhave been alarmed by the paradox of analysis. As a Parmenidean,Euclides would solve the problem of the veiled