Paradox

30 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PARADOXstrategy is to challenge the step from “There is somethingwhich is Pegasus” to “Pegasus exists.” A common objectionto Meinong is that the difficulty would reappear for negativesubsistence statements such as “Pegasus does not subsist.” Wewould need a new explanation for how these statements couldbe true.Even so, Meinong’s solution enjoyed an initial period ofpopularity. Its fortunes plummeted when Bertrand Russell(1872-1970) presented a brilliantly detailed alternative inhis classic article “On Denoting.” According to Russell,“Pegasus” is a disguised description. “Pegasus exists”means that there is exactly one horse that has wings and isridden by Bellerophon. This statement is false if there aretwo or more such horses or if there are no such horses.“Pegasus does not exist” specifies the second alternative andso means “Each thing is such that it is not a winged horseridden by Bellerophon.” This analysis frees us from referringto nonexistent objects.Russell was proud of the way his theory of definitedescriptions solved paradoxes. He advised his fellow logiciansto collect paradoxes because they serve the same role asexperiments in science. Just as we can test a theory by howwell it answers observational questions, we can also test alogical theory by how well it resolves deductive riddles.The problem-solving power of Russell’s theory, coupledwith Russell’s polemical skills, shrank Meinong to an amusingfootnote. When I was a student, Meinong was stillregarded as a marginal transitional figure. I was thereforesurprised to see a book on Meinong mentioned on a morningtelevision program. The film reviewer, Gene Shalit, wasexhibiting books with stranger and stranger titles. The climaxwas Terence Parsons’ Nonexistent Objects. Shalit was