MFA_Report_on_the_occupied_territories_March_2016_1

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“One of the cornerstones of the law of state responsibility, that the conduct of any state organ is to be considered an act of the state under international law, and therefore gives rise to the responsibility of the state if it constitutes a breach of an obligation of the state”. 621 The ILC commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility underlined the broad nature of this principle and emphasized that the reference to State organs in this provision: “Is not limited to the organs of central government, to officials at high level or to persons with responsibility for the external relations of the state. It extends to organs of government of whatever kind or classification, exercising whatever functions, and at whatever level in the hierarchy, including those at provincial or even local level”. 622 Similarly, Article 5 provides that the conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under Article 4, but which is empowered by the law of the State to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be considered as an act of the State under international law, provided that the person or entity in question was acting in that capacity in the instance in question. Accordingly, activities by armed units of the State, including those empowered so to act, will engage the responsibility of the State. Thus, Armenia is responsible internationally for actions (and omissions) of its armed forces in their activities in Azerbaijan. 623 A key element of State responsibility, and one particularly significant for present purposes, is the rule enshrined in Article 8 that: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a state under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that state in carrying out the conduct”. This provision essentially covers two situations: first, where persons act directly under the instructions of State authorities and, secondly, where persons are acting under the “direction or control”. The latter point is critical. It means that States cannot avoid responsibility for the acts of secessionist entities where in reality it is the State which is controlling the activities of such entities. The difference between the two situations enumerated in Article 8 is the level of control exercised. In the former case, the persons concerned are in effect part of the apparatus of the State insofar the particular situation is concerned. In the latter case, the power of the State is rather more diffuse. 624 The International Court addressed the matter in the Nicaragua case, where it was noted that in order for the State to be responsible for the activities, it would need to be demonstrated that the State “had effective control of the military or paramilitary operation in the course of which the alleged violations were committed”. 625 This approach was reaffirmed in the Genocide Convention case. 626 Geneva Convention IV provides the continued existence of convention rights and duties irrespective of the will of the occupying power. Article 47 in particular provides that: “Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the 621 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of the international Court of Justice of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. <strong>Report</strong>s 2007, para. 385. It was held that this principle constituted a rule of customary international law, ibid. See also Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur, I.C.J. <strong>Report</strong>s 1999, pp. 62, 87. 622 See James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries, op. cit., p. 95. 623 See <strong>Report</strong> on the international legal rights of the Azerbaijani internally displaced personsand the Republic of Armenia’s responsibility, op. cit., para. 36. 624 Ibid., para. 38. 625 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United states of America), op. cit., para. 115. 626 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of the international Court of Justice of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. <strong>Report</strong>s 2007, paras. 385, 398 and following. 97
said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory”. In particular, the rights provided for under international humanitarian law cannot be avoided by recourse to the excuse that another party is exercising elements of power within the framework of the occupation. This is the scenario that Roberts has referred to in noting that occupying powers often seek to disguise or limit their own role by operating indirectly by, for example, setting up “some kind of quasi-independent puppet regime”. 627 It is clear, however, that an occupying power cannot evade its responsibility by creating, or otherwise providing for the continuing existence of, a subordinate local administration. The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict has, for example, provided as follows: “The occupying power cannot circumvent its responsibilities by installing a puppet government or by issuing orders that are implemented through local government officials still operating in the territory”. 628 Some of the internationally wrongful acts attributed to States should be seen as a serious breach of obligations under peremptory norms (jus cogens) of general international law. The obligations under such norms arise from those substantive rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human values. 629 Among these prohibitions, it is generally agreed that the prohibitions of aggression, the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture are to be regarded as peremptory. 630 There can be no doubt that a number of such prohibitions have been violated during Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan. Not only was Armenia’s role as the aggressor clear but the level of its continuing control over Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan is significant, and these actions entail State responsibility under international law. As noted above, in its judgment of 16 June 2015, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that: “[T]he Republic of Armenia, from the early days of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has had a significant and decisive influence over the “NKR”, that the two entities are highly integrated in virtually all important matters and that this situation persists to this day. In other words, the “NKR” and its administration survives by virtue of the military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia which, consequently, exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories …” 631 Accordingly, the conclusion must be that due to its initial and continuing aggression against Azerbaijan and persisting occupation of this State’s territory accomplished both directly through its own organs, agents and officials and indirectly through the subordinate separatist regime in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region over which it exercises effective control as it is understood under international law, Armenia bears full international responsibility for the breaches of international law. Armenia’s international responsibility, which is incurred by its internationally wrongful acts, involves legal consequences manifested in the obligation to cease these acts, to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees that they will not recur and to provide full reparation for injury in the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination. 632 627 See Adam Roberts, op. cit., pp. 580, 586. 628 See UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford, 2004), p. 282. 629 See James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries, op. cit., commentary to Article 40, pp. 245-246, para. 3. 630 Ibid., commentary to Article 26, p. 188, para. 5, and commentary to Article 40, pp. 245-248, paras. 1-9. 631 See Chiragov and others v. Armenia, op. cit., para. 186. 632 See James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries, op. cit., pp. 66-68. 98
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Contents A. Introduction 5 B. Execu
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A. Introduction At the end of 1987,
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The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen co
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B. Executive Summary The examined e
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Armenian statistical information sh
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thus profit from and support the oc
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programmes that ultimately serve th
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the field commanders. 20 S.Ohanyan
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II. Continued attempts of Armenia t
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the country’s president.” 44 Ar
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the NKR.” 58 According to the Arm
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Armenian public to be a subsidiary
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planning, development of collaborat
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Settlement activities in the occupi
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and mechanical growth. 134 In 2001,
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the separatist regime Arthur Aghabe
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Orientation for the newly arrived S
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There are reports that Syrian Armen
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Armenia’s Dorozhnik LLC company i
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as of 2013. Thus, for example, whil
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X. Providing products, investments,
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in Armenia lack sufficient financia
Page 48 and 49: consists of public figures and busi
Page 50 and 51: percent shares of Armenia's Armswis
Page 52 and 53: Armenia’s Prime Minister Hovik Ab
Page 54 and 55: “Kataro” wine production facili
Page 56 and 57: It is difficult to determine the ac
Page 58 and 59: The Asmaryan family from Syria work
Page 60 and 61: Former Prime Minister Tigran Sargsy
Page 62 and 63: Bako Sahakyan visits agricultural f
Page 64 and 65: Armenia is particularly interested
Page 66 and 67: President of Armenia visits “Trgh
Page 68 and 69: Wheat and other crops harvested in
Page 70 and 71: Back in February 1995, the National
Page 72 and 73: Caterpillar heavy machines are used
Page 74 and 75: 270 tons 460 ). Extracted unprocess
Page 76 and 77: Unprocessed ore form Soyudlu gold m
Page 78 and 79: acquainted with the works there. 48
Page 80 and 81: Prime Minister of Armenia Hovik Abr
Page 82 and 83: As far as gold is concerned, Armeni
Page 84 and 85: protection) in the Bashitchay Natio
Page 86 and 87: As of 2015, approximately 460 mines
Page 88 and 89: Juma Mosque in the occupied city of
Page 90 and 91: E. Obligations and Responsibility u
Page 92 and 93: should follow the UN Guiding Princi
Page 94 and 95: No exception or provision for derog
Page 96 and 97: the invoked laws cannot be consider
Page 100 and 101: Serious breaches of obligations und
Page 102 and 103: Nagorno-Karabakh was unilaterally d
Page 104 and 105: A large number of domestic criminal
Page 106 and 107: F. Urgent Measures to Cease and Rev
Page 108: G. ANNEXES Original designations of
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