PENALTY
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THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE<br />
PROGRESSIVE ABOLITION<br />
OF THE DEATH <strong>PENALTY</strong><br />
Christof Heyns and Thomas Probert 1<br />
By a number of measures, support for the death penalty is diminishing<br />
worldwide. There has been a slow but steady decline in the<br />
number of states that legally recognise it. 2 The number of states that<br />
actually practise the death penalty also continues to drop. 3 Moreover,<br />
while the death penalty used to be a global practice, of all executions<br />
known to have been conducted in 2014 outside of China, nearly<br />
three-quarters took place in just three countries: Iran, Iraq and Saudi<br />
Arabia. 4 If unconfirmed reports of a drastic reduction in executions<br />
in China over the last decade are accurate, 5 then the absolute number<br />
of people being executed per year is also going down. If represented<br />
as executions per capita, the trend is even more striking.<br />
It would appear, therefore, that the death penalty is in gradual—<br />
quite possibly terminal—decline worldwide. This chapter places this<br />
observation in the context of the treatment of the right to life in<br />
international law, which is evolving towards the idea that life may as<br />
a general rule not be taken intentionally except if there is no other<br />
1 Christof Heyns is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or<br />
arbitrary executions and professor of human rights law at the University of Pretoria, where he<br />
co-directs the Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa. Thomas Probert is the<br />
senior researcher of the Unlawful Killings Unit of the Centre for Human Rights at the University<br />
of Pretoria and a research associate at the Centre of Governance and Human Rights at the<br />
University of Cambridge.<br />
2 According to the classification of abolition used by Amnesty International, Fiji became the 99th<br />
abolitionist state in early 2015.<br />
3 According to Amnesty International, at least 22 countries were known to have carried out<br />
executions in 2014. Though this number is the same as in 2013, and a slight increase from 21<br />
in 2012, the trend over the last two decades has been one of decline from a high of 41 in 1995.<br />
See Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions in 2014 (London, Amnesty International,<br />
2015), p. 5.<br />
4 Amnesty International do not attempt to estimate the number of people executed in China,<br />
where the extent of the practice remains a state secret, but is thought to extend to thousands<br />
of executions each year. Of the remaining States, Iran executed at least 289 people, Iraq at least<br />
61, and Saudi Arabia at least 90, out of at least 607 executions worldwide. Next in number of<br />
executions was the United States (35), followed by Sudan (at least 23) and Yemen (at least 22).<br />
See Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions in 2014, p. 5.<br />
5 Dui Ha, “China executed 2,400 people in 2013, Dui Hua”, 20 October 2014, available from<br />
http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=9270.<br />
way to preserve another person’s life. This evolution is taking place<br />
in the context of an international legal framework that imposes an<br />
obligation on states at least progressively to work towards abolishing<br />
the death penalty. In the context of that framework, there is a trend<br />
among a range of international actors explicitly to turn away from<br />
capital punishment.<br />
In the gradual transition away from the death penalty, many have<br />
worked in a way that was in practice abolitionist, while taking care<br />
to note that international law was not inherently abolitionist. 6 An<br />
understanding of the international law surrounding the right to life<br />
(such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,<br />
Article 6) as being at least “progressively abolitionist” could allow<br />
an approach that is more in line with current state practice. It thus<br />
seems fair to say that international law is abolitionist in the sense that<br />
it requires the abolition of the death penalty, either immediately, or<br />
through the taking of steps in that direction. States that expand the<br />
scope of the death penalty are not acting in conformity with their<br />
international obligations, but so are states that maintain the status quo<br />
and do not take measures to reduce the scope and application of this<br />
form of punishment. This normative position has been reinforced by<br />
important initiatives taken by regional mechanisms, which can play<br />
a significant role in the promotion and protection of the right to life<br />
around the world.<br />
THE “PROTECT LIFE” PRINCIPLE<br />
If one proceeds from the starting point that each life is of immeasurable<br />
value and each unwarranted loss of life is a tragedy, then it is<br />
clear that there is no room for complacency as long as there is deadly<br />
violence anywhere. Yet encouragement can be taken from the general<br />
trend worldwide towards the realisation of what might be termed<br />
the “protect life” principle, which underlies the understanding of<br />
the right to life in international law. This principle requires that, as a<br />
6 The mandate of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary<br />
executions (most recently stated in July 2014 by Human Rights Council Resolution 26/12)<br />
includes a responsibility “to monitor the implementation of existing international standards on<br />
safeguards and restrictions relating to the imposition of capital punishment.” For an example of<br />
an interpretation of the mandate as at least formally non-abolitionist, see Philip Alston, Report<br />
of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on Mission to the United<br />
States (28 May 2009) [A/HRC/11/2/Add.5], paragraph 3.<br />
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