The Intelligence Review | vol. 1 | iss. 1 |

It is unlikely that the next six months will see a revival of the peace treaty process, which has
been stalled since July of 2015. Back then, the process collapsed after the Afghan government
announced that the Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died in April of 2013. Two days later, the
Taliban confirmed this and announced that Mullah Akhtar Mansour would be their new leader,
(Rasmussen 2015). This in turn led to the breakdown of the peace talks, with Pakistan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the talks would be held at a later date, due to Omar’s
death, (Popalzai 2015).
On May 21, 2016 Mullah Akhtar Mansour was killed in a US drone strike (Anon. 2016b). The
strike occurred in the Dalbandi area of Pakistan’s Balochistan province, without the
authorization of Pakistan, which stated that its sovereignty was violated during the attack.
Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada was named the new Taliban Emir on May 25, 2016 (Mashal
et al. 2016). He is a cleric by training, similar to the late Mullah Omar, and is said to have been
the one issuing the religious statements, or fatwas, supporting the military actions of the late
Mullah Mansour. This change in leadership has a high likelihood of inhibiting the peace
process, as it did in July 2015.
In September 2015, the Taliban successfully took over Kunduz, the capital of northern
Afghanistan’s Kunduz province. The takeover lasted two weeks, during which the Taliban
were able to damage and destroy government offices, free Taliban prisoners kept in the city’s
two jails, and defeat the 7,000-strong government forces with just a “few hundred fighters”
(Norland 2015). This takeover is of importance for the prospect of an official peace treaty
between the Afghan government and the Taliban, as it was the first time since their official
overthrow by US forces that the Taliban had been able to attack, take over, and hold territory.
After the takeover of Kunduz, the Taliban continued to increase their operational capabilities
under the leadership of Mullah Mansour. Despite a leadership split in late October, when
Mullah Rasool left with a splinter group, the Taliban conducted attacks in Kabul and gained
substantial territory in Helmand, pushing back government forces (Walsh 2016). These actions
demonstrated the operational capabilities of the Taliban and helped solidify the Taliban under
Mullah Mansour. Similar attacks have continued under Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, as
the Taliban’s annual spring offensive is continuing.
In January 2016, Pakistan, China, the US and the Afghan government formed the Quadrilateral
Coordination Council (QCG) to restart the process of holding official talks between the
Afghan government and the Taliban (Gady 2016). These talks were arranged to create the
conditions for possible peace treaty negotiations between the Afghan government and the
Taliban, which were ostensibly set to take place before the end of February. However, as of June
2016, there has not been a meeting between the Afghan government and Taliban representatives.
On March 5, 2016, the Taliban issued an official statement on their website, the “Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan”, which stated that they were not participating in peace talks with the
Afghan government. The statement said that “the esteemed leader of Islamic Emirate has not
authorized anyone to participate in this meeting and neither has the Leadership Council of
Islamic Emirate decided to partake in it” (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 2016a). This has in
turn stalled the peace treaty process, as has Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s refusal to
negotiate with anyone who kills civilians and engages in terrorist activities. However, as
President Ghani is refusing to talk, his disapproval rate among the Afghan people is at 76
percent, while and the disapproval rating of the entire Afghan government is at 81 percent
(Hakim 2016).
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