Arab Human Development Report 2016

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has often been suppressed by governments. Cases of detention and other acts of violence incompatible with legal texts have been reported frequently, aside from the selective authorization required by many Arab countries for associating or for demonstrating. The fight against terrorism, for example, has given some states, with or without newly issued emergency decrees, supreme power to restrict the right. Some Arab countries do not have laws on the establishment of political associations or parties, rendering their formation illegal. In several countries, individuals who want to form an association are subject to discretionary decisions of the granting authority, which abuses the vague language of the legal text so as to ban associations or to shut down existing non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Without true political competition, meaningful opposition parties and independent judiciaries and legislatures and with little room for independent civil society organizations, unconventional and volatile political and civic action may possess an appeal. The spectrum of unconventional or informal channels of engagement is diverse and ranges from activism on social media platforms to militant extremist action. While social media platforms have proved constructive in mobilizing youth, militant radicalization is obviously disastrous. Support for democracy It is possible to measure the preference for democratic order using the WVS, which asks respondents to rank their main concerns about democratic governance and strong rule. 38 On the eve of the uprisings, opinion surveys revealed that, with respect to the rest of the world, people in Arab countries desired a more democratic order relatively less; the gap was 9 percent. In nearly all countries, youth and the more well-educated have a greater preference for democracy (figure 2.11). According to regression analysis, the age effects are stronger than the education effects, and younger citizens support democratic values more than their elders in ways similar to global trends, but the positive effects of education in increasing the preference for democracy are much less potent in the region than globally (table 2.3), another reflection of the conservative nature of the education system. As in the rest of the world (and controlling for levels of education), richer people tend to be less favourable of democracy. 39 As in the rest of the world, the desire for democracy is correlated positively with high levels of self-expression. Support for democracy has been profoundly af- fected by recent political changes. Although the preference for democracy has held up since the uprisings, many countries have shown sharp compositional effects, whereby the preference is diminishing among the more well-educated and affluent, but rising among poorer citizens. 40 The noticeable pushback among the more well-educated, who were the main champions of change leading up to the uprisings, can be attributed to fears of chaos or of redistributive policies by democratically elected governments dominated by the interests of poor. While the focus has been on identity politics, an examination of opinions reveals that, by 2013, social polarization around class issues had widened, especially in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen. 41 An open question is whether the ebbing of support for democracy among the wealthier and the more well-educated will be temporary, or whether it will stretch over the longer term and be increasingly associated with a class struggle. 42 Support for Political Islam In the second part of the 20th century, the separation of religion and politics became one of the most contentious issues between adherents of political islamist movements and followers of secular political ideologies. Starting in the late 1990s, some groups within the broad range of parties espousing political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, moderated their political and social messages and came to participate in a democratic process. 43 By 2012, however, the early dominance of Islamists led to a backlash, resulting in rising social polarization around the role of religion in politics. The WVS allows one to measure the degree of support for religion in politics via the question whether “religious authorities should ultimately interpret the laws.” 44 Support for political Islam had fallen among respondents during WVS wave 6 (2010–2014), in all the countries in the sample (except among older Moroccans), with a rising divergence between younger and older groups in Egypt and Iraq (figure 2.12). In parallel, attitudes towards religion have also become more polarized, more so than in any other region of the world. 44 Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and even Yemen are extremely divided among groups that feel strongly, but differently, about religion and politics. The political focus on identity issues, especially in the context of the drafting of new constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia, has obscured the need to find politically feasible solutions to the economic challenges facing these countries.
Figure 2.11 Support for democracy by age cohort over time, and by level of education By age group 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 15-29 30-44 45-60 60+ Qatar MIC excluding AMIC Libya Jordan Arab Countries Lebanon Algeria Palestine Iraq Yemen Egypt Tunisia Morocco By education level 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 Elementary Secondary University Qatar MIC excluding AMIC Libya Jordan Arab Countries Lebanon Algeria Palestine Iraq Yemen Egypt Tunisia Morocco Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014. MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries. Higher value means more support for democracy
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Arab Human Development Report 2016
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Foreword by the Administrator, UNDP
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Foreword by the Regional Director,
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Finally, the third level relates to
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Report Team Youth Consultative Grou
Page 13 and 14: Acronyms and abbreviations IMR IoM
Page 15 and 16: Contents Chapter 1 Youth and human
Page 17 and 18: Contents • Non-communicable disea
Page 19 and 20: Contents 8.1 The United Nations Sec
Page 21 and 22: Chapter 1 Youth and human developme
Page 23 and 24: Figure 1.1 The changing share of yo
Page 25 and 26: The defining vision of the AHDR ser
Page 27 and 28: made more acute by the institutiona
Page 29 and 30: 1.4.1 The failure of the Arab devel
Page 31 and 32: projects, unproductive public secto
Page 33 and 34: and kept women subordinated at home
Page 35 and 36: The uprisings of 2011 prompted the
Page 37 and 38: Box 1.5 Youth: The need to belong L
Page 39 and 40: Israel by their countries. Only 21
Page 41 and 42: Table 1.4 Military spending, select
Page 43 and 44: Endnotes 1 UNDP 2013c. 2 UNDP 2014a
Page 45 and 46: Chapter 2 Values, identities and ci
Page 47 and 48: gender equality and waning obedienc
Page 49 and 50: In most Arab countries, youth exper
Page 51 and 52: Figure 2.2 Self-Expression by age g
Page 53 and 54: Figure 2.3 Mobile cellular subscrip
Page 55 and 56: are scarce, whether a university ed
Page 57 and 58: Figure 2.7 Gender equality before a
Page 59 and 60: Arab region are more pious than oth
Page 61 and 62: Table 2.3 The relationship between
Page 63: Table 2.4 Indicators of formal barr
Page 67 and 68: Even in 2013, opposition to the sep
Page 69 and 70: Figure 2.14 Social and religious to
Page 71 and 72: Endnotes 1 Inglehart and Welzel 201
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 Education and the transit
Page 75 and 76: Figure 3.1 Average years of schooli
Page 77 and 78: 3.2 Inequality of opportunity in ed
Page 79 and 80: Box 3.1 Steffen Hertog Characterist
Page 81 and 82: Figure 3.2 Youth unemployment rate
Page 83 and 84: 3.5 Policies that could help labour
Page 85 and 86: egulatory costs in starting and run
Page 87: 48 IMF 2014b. 49 World Bank 2013a.
Page 90 and 91: 4.1 The challenges facing young wom
Page 92 and 93: Box 4.1 Aseel Alawadhi: Cancellatio
Page 94 and 95: Box 4.2 Hibaaq Osman: Girls in conf
Page 96 and 97: Table 4.1 Population and reproducti
Page 98 and 99: Box 4.3 Islamic feminism across bor
Page 100 and 101: Box 4.4 An inclusive space: Egypt
Page 102 and 103: 4.4 Removing the cultural and econo
Page 104 and 105: Endnotes 1 IRIN 2009. 2 Algeria, Ba
Page 107 and 108: Chapter 5 Health Status and Access
Page 109 and 110: on younger adolescents in the 13-15
Page 111 and 112: of fatalities (annex 2 figure A.9).
Page 113 and 114: While FGM is supported by religious
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from exposure to tobacco smoke, reg
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Figure 5.5 Healthy life expectancy,
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5.4 Health interventions to promote
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• Money: the services available t
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Endnotes 1 WHO defines health promo
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71 See http://www.search-institute.
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6.1 Youth in war-torn countries: gr
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continue long after peace treaties
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Box 6.3 The impact of war and viole
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Youth-specific health outcome indic
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injury, or a threat of injury, or a
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including war, on well-being is med
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the larger regional community of kn
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eproduce and deepen the negative ef
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Endnotes 1 Farmer 2004, p. 307. “
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90 Mehchy 2014, p. 17. 91 Al-Monito
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Chapter 7 Exclusion, mobility and m
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Figure 7.1 Arab migration by region
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than a quarter (26 percent). By com
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Figure 7.4 Share of young migrants
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of their exclusion at home. 34 The
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Box 7.3 Florence Jusot: The impact
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7.4 Some benefits of mobility Young
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Remittances are mainly spent on con
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of practice. Finally, engineering a
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28 The logic was that economic libe
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8.1 Youth in the Arab region: Chall
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Figure 8.1 Perceptions of youth on
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Figure 8.3 Number of terrorist atta
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Figure 8.5 The Arab region: Home to
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Figure 8.7a My World: The prioritie
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of the Arab Centre for Research and
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Disengagement & reintegration 17. E
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Box 8.2 Fahem mish hafez* Tahrir Ac
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likely to grow and generate jobs. T
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Investment in youth participation r
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Bibliography and references List of
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Bibliography and references Psychot
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Bibliography and references Prevent
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Bibliography and references . 2004.
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Bibliography and references Euromon
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Bibliography and references the You
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Bibliography and references . 2014.
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Bibliography and references Lewis,
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Bibliography and references . 2013b
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Bibliography and references Pritche
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Bibliography and references http://
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Bibliography and references . 2013c
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Bibliography and references . 2011c
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Bibliography and references in Arab
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Statistical Appendix
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with their life as a whole, and a s
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Indicators Data Source Age-group Ar
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Annex 1 Human development indicator
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Acronyms and abbreviations HDI GNI
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Human Development Report 2014 - Sus
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Annex 2 Additional figures and tabl
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Figure A.3 Global share of forcibly
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Figure A.7 School-to-work transitio
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Figure A.10 Prevalence of overweigh
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Figure A.13 Life expectancy at birt
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Figure A.15 Altruism towards strang
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Table A.1 Bilateral remittance esti
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Table A.5 Reasons for stopping educ
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Table A.9 Political representation
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Table A.12 Women with unmet contrac
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Table A.16 Migration to and from Ar
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Table A.18 Inward migration to Arab
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272 Notes
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