SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
In February 2016, General John F. Campbell, then the Resolute Support (RS) and
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) commander, informed the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) that Afghanistan had not achieved the enduring level of security and
stability sufficient to justify a reduction in U.S. support of the ANDSF. 15 Also that month,
National Intelligence Director James Clapper put the SASC on notice that the intelligence
community believed “fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015, continuing a decadelong
trend of deteriorating security.” 16
These views are not new. General Joseph F. Dunford, former commander of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and USFOR-A, had earlier warned Congress
that the ANDSF would need continued support to keep Afghanistan secure. On March 12,
2014, he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “If we leave at the end of
2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate. The security environment will
begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.” 17
The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that the ANDSF struggled with high operational tempo and lack of
Coalition support in 2015, their first full year conducting independent operations. The director
said these conditions led to uneven operations execution and as a result, insurgents
were able to expand their influence in rural areas. He contended that deploying specialized
Afghan units and their supporting units is necessary to secure key population centers
in Afghanistan. 18 However, the commander of the ANA Special Operations Command
expressed frustration over the misuse of Afghan special forces, calling for them to be used
for specific, short-term missions instead of for defending territory. 19 One Resolute Support
advisor expressed concern that the ANA’s over-reliance on “commandos” risks burning out
those elite forces. 20 During a December 2, 2016, press briefing General Nicholson expressed
concern about sustaining the number of operations the Afghan special forces execute and
the plan to regenerate the special forces over the winter months. 21
As the security situation has deteriorated in Kabul, several U.S. agencies reported
impacts on their missions and movement. The agencies included the Treasury’s Office of
Technical Assistance (OTA), the Department of Justice, and the USAID’s Afghanistan Trade
and Revenue (ATAR) project office. 22
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has warned that much work remains to
be done to develop and maintain a modern Afghan army and national police, and to build
ministerial capacity in military and police planning, budgets, program operation, acquisition,
and personnel processes.
Since its creation in 2008, SIGAR has developed a substantial body of work on U.S.
reconstruction activities in the security sector, including 49 performance-audit and inspection
reports. 23 These reports highlighted areas in which ANDSF capacity and capabilities
are at risk and provided recommendations to strengthen and improve reconstruction
efforts. Most of SIGAR’s security-sector audit products fall into six issue areas, some are
addressed in other areas within this High-Risk List report:
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION