SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
found that the Afghan government would likely require assistance to cover these expenses
for several years after the plant’s completion. 105 Four years later, a 2014 USAID audit of the
same power plant found that it was still not being operated and maintained in a sustainable
manner by DABS. Training did not prepare personnel to run the plant or maintain the equipment,
and DABS did not provide adequate management support or ensure the plant had
enough spare parts at hand. 106 In 2015, SIGAR determined that the plant remains severely
underutilized. 107
DABS and other government entities will eventually be responsible for sustaining the
Northeast Power System and Southeast Power System projects, including O&M costs once
they are completed and turned over to the government. 108 However, a July 2012 SIGAR audit
on Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund projects—mostly large-scale energy-sector infrastructure
projects jointly managed and implemented by USAID and USFOR-A—raised questions
about DABS’s capacity and said that Afghanistan lacks the financial and other resources
necessary to pay for O&M. It also found that although USAID and USFOR-A prepared sustainment
plans for these projects, the plans included no cost-sustainment analysis. 109
An April 2013 SIGAR audit examined USAID’s $61 million efforts to commercialize
DABS. Because of a lack of data about other directorates, SIGAR focused its report on
DABS-Kabul. Despite some improvements in revenue collection, DABS-Kabul was not
self-sufficient. 110 USAID said DABS’s revenues have increased over the last three years,
allowing it to pay for more of its operating expenses, although nonrecurring major capitalinfrastructure
expenses are still mainly funded by donors. 111 A World Bank report cautioned
that even though DABS, with donor assistance, has been able to reduce some commercial
losses (unbilled sales, uncollectibles, and power theft) and improve revenue collections,
its commercial and technical (transmission and distribution operational) losses “remain
significant.” The report added that DABS cannot raise or expect donors to provide the capital
necessary to meet Afghanistan’s energy-infrastructure requirements. 112 Afghanistan will
likely be unable to sustain U.S. investments in this sector.
Other Infrastructure Sustainability
The United States has also invested heavily in the Afghan health sector. U.S. on- and
off-budget assistance to Afghanistan’s health sector totaled more than $1 billion as of
September 30, 2016. 113 A 2013 SIGAR audit examined the $18.5 million spent to build two
hospitals in Afghanistan and determined that USAID did not fully assess the Ministry
of Public Health’s (MOPH) ability to operate and maintain the facilities. The new O&M
costs for these hospitals could be five times the costs of the hospitals they replaced,
a burden that neither USAID nor the MOPH agreed to assume. 114 This investment is
likely unsustainable.
A 2015 SIGAR inquiry into locations of USAID’s now-concluded $233 million Partnership
Contracts for Health (PCH) program, which funded health-care facilities in 13 Afghan
provinces, found inaccurate location information for nearly 80%. 115 After analyzing updated
location coordinates provided by USAID, SIGAR found new irregularities, which USAID
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION